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James Wilson’s World 
The struggle to understand and define the American Revolution is as old as the nation it 
founded. Part of that struggle stems from the Revolution's momentous importance and its status 
as the primary organizing event around which we consider the purpose and promise of American 
life. Beyond the weight it holds in contemporary politics and national character, the Revolution’s 
legacy is complicated by the sheer number of experiences it engendered. It impacted people 
across all levels of society, from enslaved individuals dreaming of freedom, to the King of Great 
Britain determined to maintain the empire he believed was his divine birthright. It was a military 
conflict, a political reorganization, an economic exercise and an intellectual exploration. Fields 
ranging from fashion to philosophy felt its impact. The challenge for historians studying the 
Revolution is to make sense of all of the different threads which comprise it.  
Reflecting on the event in his retirement, John Adams offered a definitive view of what 
aspects of the Revolution carried import. “The Revolution,” he wrote, “was effected before the 
War commenced. The Revolution was in the Minds and Hearts of the People.”1 To Adams, what 
was most important was its intellectual dimension: the change in expectations and feeling among 
citizens who envisioned new ways of thinking about society, about politics, about the very 
relationship between individuals and the world around them.2 Had he lived long enough to offer 
a disinterested reflection on its meaning, it is likely that James Wilson, one of Adams’ 
                                                
1 John Adams, “From John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818,” Founders Online, National 
Archives.  
2  In Inventing the People, Edmund Morgan argues that the success of government depends on the 
acceptance by the people of a fictitious set of values or beliefs which bind them to the polity. The Revolution 
successfully shifted the set of values accepted by the American people away from monarchical right and instead 
emphasized the innate power of the people. Adam’s emphasis on intellectual transformation highlights this way of 
conceptualizing the Revolution. See: Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in 
England and America, (New York: Norton, 1988). 
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contemporaries, would have agreed with him on the importance of the Revolution’s intellectual 
dimension.  
James Wilson is an understudied yet intriguing member of the founding generation. Born, 
raised, and educated in Scotland, he was one of the eight signers of the Declaration of 
Independence from outside the colonies and one of two who hailed from Scotland. Physically, he 
was reported to be quite striking. Like George Washington, he was taller than the average person 
and as noted by his biographer Charles Page Smith, “inclin[ed] a little to stoutness,” which made 
him a commanding presence upon entering a room.3 Hopelessly nearsighted, he wore a 
distinctive set of thick spectacles which, perched upon a perfectly coiffed white wig, make him 
easily recognizable in portraits from the era. Most who commented on his personality mentioned 
his erudition and rhetorical skill, with John Adams even remarking in a letter to his wife Abigail 
that his first impressions of Wilson were of his “Fortitude, Rectitude, and Abilities.”4 Speaking 
of him at the Constitutional Convention, fellow delegate William Pierce noted Wilson’s “fine 
genius” and the fact that he was “well acquainted with man and…the passions that interest him.” 
Pierce also noted his aptitude in government while claiming Wilson to be “no great Orator.” 
Instead, “He draws the attention not by the charm of his eloquence, but by the force of his 
reasoning.”5 Another commentator also found Wilson to be “‘haughty’ and ‘aristocratic.” Even 
                                                
3 Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742-1798, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1956), 202.  
4 “John Adams to Abigail Adams, 23 July 1775,” Founders Online, National Archives. This letter was 
written after Wilson first arrived at the Continental Congress as a member of the Pennsylvania Delegation. 
Interestingly enough, Adams’ praise of Wilson was written in comparison to John Dickinson, who taught Wilson the 
law. Adams’ dig towards Dickinson suggests that even at this early date he was already frustrated by Dickinson’s 
characteristic moderation.  
5 William Pierce, “Notes of Major William Pierce (Georgia) in the Federal Convention of 1787”, from the 
Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pierce.asp. By drawing attention to Wilson’s connection of 
man’s nature and moral reasoning to political reasoning, Pierce correctly summarized the motivating forces behind 
Wilson’s unique approach to political thought.  
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so, that writer still labeled him as “intrepid, energetic, eloquent, profound, and artful.”6 James 
Wilson was all of these things. Across his career, he was recognized as a man of both prodigious 
skill and great intellect who gained influence through the force of his ideas.  
Throughout his life, Wilson held a variety of public offices. He began as a lawyer and 
then revolutionary organizer on the Pennsylvania Frontier and ended as a Supreme Court Justice. 
In between he was a representative to the Continental Congress, a signer of the Declaration of 
Independence, France’s Advocate-General in the United States, and perhaps most importantly, a 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention.7 Wilson also grew to be considered one of the elite 
members of Pennsylvania society, holding memberships in many of Philadelphia’s most 
prestigious social organizations and clubs. He also acquired a vast fortune through landholding 
and speculation although these habits ultimately led to his downfall: Wilson died disgraced and 
on the run from creditors in 1798.  
Wilson’s life is best characterized using the words chosen by Page Smith in his 
biography: “a life of the mind.”8 Wilson was educated in Scotland at the Universities of St. 
Andrews and Glasgow during the height of the so-called Scottish Enlightenment, making him 
one of the best-educated men in the founding generation. He thought deeply about political 
issues and commented not only on the pressing issues of the day but also on wider intellectual 
frameworks and thought patterns. Although eighteenth-century intellectual life was not 
segmented into the disciplines we now take for granted, Wilson made meaningful contributions 
to what would become political science, law, moral philosophy, and the political economy.  
                                                
6 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 3, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1911), 236. 
7 Wilson also briefly served as a commissioned militia colonel in Cumberland County militia regiment, 
although he never saw service or led his troops in any meaningful way.  
8 Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father, 205.  
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Despite his importance to revolutionary thought, historians have given him little 
attention, especially when compared to his more celebrated contemporaries. The only full-length 
biography of Wilson was written by Page Smith in the 1950s. Although it contains a thorough 
treatment of his life events, its dated writing style and sparse analysis limit its utility to modern 
scholars. At its best, it is a useful starting point for understanding Wilson and for filling in 
narrative gaps. In place of full treatments, the scholarship on Wilson is defined by a series of 
articles and chapters which generally only deal with specific elements of his thought including 
topics like his place in American memory, his use of metaphor as a philosophic device, or his 
theory of revolution.9 Although these articles are each interesting in their own right, they limit 
our ability to draw comprehensive characterizations of Wilson across his long and varied career.  
As a result, scholarly consensus on Wilson's thought is remarkably uneven. The 
fundamental problem is the gap between Wilson’s historical reputation and the actual reality of 
his recorded thought. As a wealthy gentleman and member of the political elite, Wilson moved 
within the highest circles of Philadelphia Society –– leading to charges of anti-democratic and 
even aristocratic behavior. His closest associate, Robert Morris, was renowned for his opposition 
to popular democracy and during the tumultuous period in Pennsylvania following 
Independence, Wilson often found himself in opposition to popular actors and sentiments. As a 
result, many glancing accounts of Wilson’s life and work in less specialized treatments 
characterize him as both conservative and anti-democratic.10 Contrary to this record, however, a 
                                                
9 See for example: Nicholas Pedersen, “The Lost Founder: James Wilson in American Memory.” Yale 
Journal of Law & the Humanities 22, no. 2 (2010): 257-337.; Stephen A. Conrad, “Metaphor and Imagination in 
James Wilson's Theory of Federal Union.” Law & Social Inquiry 13, no. 1 (1988): 1-70.; and George M. Dennison, 
“The ‘Revolution Principle’: Ideology and Constitutionalism in the Thought of James Wilson,” The Review of 
Politics 39, no. 2 (1977): 157-91. 
10 See for example: Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: ‘the People’, the Founders, and the Troubled 
Ending of the American Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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careful reading of his thought reveals an inherent “radical democratic streak” that runs in 
opposition to his historiographical reputation.11 Those who move beyond the superficiality of his 
position in society have identified several key traits which shed light on the peculiarities and 
potential problems at the core of Wilsonian thought.  
First, Wilson was uniquely optimistic as a thinker when compared to other prominent 
members of the Founding Generation. Whereas John Adams possessed a dark dyspeptic outlook 
on humanity that colored his views of government, Wilson never doubted that humanity was at 
its heart good and that the human experience trended towards improvement and positivity.12 This 
philosophical outlook also separated him from someone like James Madison, a contemporary 
often compared to Wilson due to their combined influence at the Constitutional Convention. At 
its heart, Madisonianism carries with it the assumption that different societal interests are 
irreconcilable and in opposition. Madisonian thought revolves around the careful control and 
mitigation of those interests through careful institutional design.13 Wilson rejected that kind of 
division of society. Instead, in keeping with a characteristically optimistic outlook, he believed in 
the power of societal improvement to promote virtue, limit vice, and solve the issues that 
Madison addressed in his own thought.14  
The philosophical approaches which undergirded Wilson’s thought also differed 
dramatically from many of his contemporaries. It has been said by one modern commentator that 
                                                
11 Aaron T. Knapp, “Law's Revolutionary: James Wilson and the Birth of American Jurisprudence,” The 
Journal of Law & Politics 29, no. 2 (2014): 190. 
12 For the most thorough treatment of the interaction between Adams’ pessimism and his political thought 
see: Nancy Isenberg, and Andrew Burstein, The Problem of Democracy: The Presidents Adams Confront the Cult of 
Personality (New York: Viking, 2019). 
13 Madison’s philosophy of interests is best expressed in Federalist no. 10. See: James Madison, “Federalist 
No. 10,” in The Federalist, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2006), 51-59.  
14 Aaron T. Knapp, “Law's Revolutionary,” 194-198.  
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the totality of American thought during the Revolution can be traced back to John Locke.15 
While that may be true of certain members of the Founding Generation, it does not accurately 
reflect Wilson’s philosophical origins. Wilson was heavily influenced by the Scottish common-
sense school of philosophy and believed strongly that, as phrased by one historian, “a citizenry 
who have adopted philosophical skepticism will lose their political freedom.”16 In place of 
philosophical skepticism, he believed that politics derived from moral precepts, and in keeping 
with the teachings of common sense philosophy, believed that the most important moral precepts 
could be traced back to first principles and the will of God. This outlook drove Wilson towards a 
heavy consideration of the power of natural law in political life that colored much of his thought. 
It also led him to consider the ways in which moral health intersected with political action, 
leading to what one historian referred to as “polite republicanism.”17 Wilson always viewed 
politics as a way to fulfill the tenets of natural law through the cultivation of virtue. 
Wilson also considered the individual to be the key object of political action. It is again 
useful to compare Wilson to Adams and Madison, contemporaries with whom he bares 
superficial similarities, in order to understand Wilson as a thinker. Adams emphasized balancing 
the three orders of society together through mixed government to ensure harmony and the 
protection of rights.18 Madison was primarily concerned with controlling and mitigating faction. 
By contrast, Wilson, in blending his fundamental optimism with common-sense teachings, 
                                                
15 C. Bradley Thompson, America’s Revolutionary Mind, (New York: Encounter, 2019), 32-34.  
16 Roberta Bayer, “The Common Sense American Republic: The Political Philosophy of James Wilson 
(1742-1798),” Studia Gilsoniana 4, no. 3 (2015): 206. 
17 Stephen A. Conrad, “Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican 
Theory,” The Supreme Court Review (1984): 359-88.  
18 The most thorough work analyzing Adams’ political philosophy as a whole is Richard Alan 
Ryerson, John Adams's Republic: The One, the Few, and the Many, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2016). 
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looked to the individual as the primary target of political action and his goal was always to 
promote individual advancement and improvement. This, he believed, would secure the benefits 
of republicanism while protecting the republic from the dangers of tyranny and internal collapse.  
Part of the problem with understanding Wilson lies in the fact that he was not a 
particularly ideological thinker in a recognizable modern sense. Factionalism and the rise of 
party politics in the 1790s shifted political culture in a modern direction, making accounting for 
the movements of political actors prior to this point more difficult for modern historians.19 
Although much work has been done by historians to excavate the ideological minds of early 
American thinkers, ideology often provides a poor foundation from which to analyze the nature 
of political discussion in the eighteenth century. The most important consideration we can make 
is that the seeds of what we now recognize as political science and political theory were planted 
firmly in the field of moral philosophy. Politics was a moral endeavor, and so to understand 
Wilson’s thought we must approach it in terms of morality.20 
Several scholars have adopted a moral lens when studying Wilson. These sources add 
much to our consideration of his thought.21 They note that Wilson’s adoption of common sense 
philosophy, strong belief in moral improvement and optimistic philosophical outlook provided 
                                                
19 This tendency is one explanation for the gap between Wilson’s action and reputation. Because he derived 
political beliefs from conceptions of morality and not ideological preferences, modern scholars studying ideology 
often see contradictions in his thought that could be better resolved by adopting a moral lens.   
20 C. Bradley Thompson has argued persuasively for the importance of morality in understanding 
eighteenth-century politics in America’s Revolutionary Mind. His method utilizes the connection between moral 
reasoning, moral principle, motives, and actions to argue that shifts in moral reasoning occasioned shifts in action 
during the Revolution. Wilson’s thought exemplifies his argument.  
21 See for example: James R. Zink, and Michelle Schwarze, “James Wilson’s Science of Politics and the 
Moral Psychology of American Constitutionalism,” American Political Thought 7, no. 4 (2018): 588-613.; Stephen 
A. Conrad, “Polite Foundation”; Eduardo A. Velásquez, “Rethinking America's Modernity: Natural Law, Natural 
Rights and the Character of James Wilson's Liberal Republicanism,” Polity 29, no. 2 (1996): 193-220; and Roberta 
Bayer, “The Common Sense American Republic.” 
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critical structure to his politics.22 One of the most perceptive critiques of how moral philosophy 
shaped Wilson’s thought is offered by Eduardo A. Velásquez, who argues that Wilson’s 
combination of Hobbes’ and Locke’s emphasis on passion with Scottish notions of sociability 
led him to create a modern liberal theory of republicanism predicated on the moral health of 
individuals. The result of this, Velásquez argues, “is a view of the liberal republic as an arena for 
the activation and expansion of the moral sentiments, not merely as a mechanism for the 
balancing of interests.”23 Velásquez correctly surmises that Wilson’s view of the self differed 
significantly from his contemporaries, and in accounting for that difference, our understanding of 
the character and nature of the American republic changes.24 Attention to Wilson reveals the 
ways in which the American project was above all else a moral project founded in a strident 
understanding of natural law. Velásquez’s analysis is rooted primarily in Wilson’s natural law 
teachings, which provide an important foundation for understanding him as a moral thinker. By 
extending this contention to cover Wilson’s actions and thoughts across his career, we can gain a 
stronger understanding of the way moral quantities shaped Wilson’s approach to politics. And, 
above all others, the moral quantity which mattered most to Wilson was happiness.  
Happiness was an oft-used term in eighteenth-century thought, so much so that it is often 
difficult to track exactly what a writer meant when invoking the term because its use required 
little explication for contemporary readers. Its most famous usage during the period, at least to 
present-day readers, came in the Declaration of Independence which labeled its pursuit an 
unalienable right alongside life and liberty.25 But Jefferson was not the only writer to invoke the 
                                                
22 James R. Zink, and Michelle Schwarze, “James Wilson’s Science of Politics,” 592-598.  
23 Eduardo A. Velásquez, “Rethinking America’s Modernity,” 193.  
24 Eduardo A. Velásquez, “Rethinking America’s Modernity,” 194-197.  
25 Although many scholars have conflated Jefferson’s pursuit of happiness with Lockean notions of 
property, this is inappropriate. See for example: William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Perceptions of 
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term. It has been argued persuasively that rather than being characterized as ‘the age of reason’ 
the eighteenth-century intellectual world ought to be characterized as the ‘age of happiness,’ 
given its centrality to thought at the time.26 Rather than being primarily concerned with abstract 
rationality, thinkers were concerned with the improvement of the human condition. “The pursuit 
of happiness,” one historian writes, “was the overriding purpose of enlightened thought.”27 
Through happiness, enlightened eighteenth century thinkers hoped to craft a better world.  
In modern terms, happiness usually refers to a glancing or temporary feeling of emotional 
contentment. When eighteenth-century thinkers invoked the term, they referred to several 
conjoined ideals that carried a much deeper meaning. First, philosophically the idea of happiness 
was tied closely to natural law and the pursuit of virtue.28 It was widely accepted that God, in 
creating humans, made “happiness” the chief end of their existence and that to be happy meant 
one was living in accordance with the will of God. Said the famed English jurist William 
Blackstone, “[the Creator] has…so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the 
happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former.”29 To 
be happy was to be at peace with one’s surroundings through the sound application of virtuous 
conduct. As the century progressed, natural law philosophers extended this contention to make 
                                                
Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1977). Scott argues that 
Jefferson used happiness to largely mean property, but that he substituted happiness to add a moral dimension to the 
discussion, largely as a response to slavery. While property plays an important role in happiness, eighteenth-century 
understandings of the term did not reduce it to only property. Jefferson’s use of the more expansive “happiness” in 
place of a term like property with a more restrictive definition challenges us to consider its meaning in a much wider 
context.  
26 Ritchie Robertson, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680 – 1790, (New York: Harper, 
2021), Preface and Chapter I. 
27 Ritchie Robertson, The Enlightenment, xvii.  
28 See Carli N. Conklin, The Pursuit of Happiness in the Founding Era, (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 2019).  
29 William Blackstone, quoted in Carli N. Conklin, The Pursuit of Happiness, 13.  
 10 
critiques about the relationship between government and society, arguing that attaining happiness 
necessitated the alignment of government action with natural law.  
Happiness also had more physical meanings as well and encompassed both mental 
contentment and material prosperity. When one was happy, they possessed the “security, 
stability, and peace” needed to prosper. To prosper on an individual level was to possess 
“serenely balanced intellectual moral faculties,” “to advance in the earthly realm” (meaning to 
achieve material success or achievement), and to “experience happiness around the domestic 
hearth.” In short, for eighteenth-century beings, earthly happiness was nothing less than “a 
glimpse of the eternal happiness of heaven.”30 In less optimistic terms, happiness’ physical 
dimension could be tied to the pursuit of individual interest. As developed by historian David 
Wootton, one of the primary hallmarks of enlightenment thought was the progressive 
subjectivizing of previously rigid terms like happiness.31 Wootton argues that happiness began to 
be associated purely with the real experience of pleasure. This stands in contrast to the classical 
understanding of happiness, closely associated with the Greek concept of Eudaimonia, which 
associated pleasure with virtue. In practice, this meant that people began to define happiness not 
along abstract notions but rather along what interested them. 32 Thus, happiness could take a 
variety of forms according to one’s tastes, ranging from the hedonistic accumulation of wealth 
for the merchant to virtuous poverty for the religious ascetic.  
                                                
30 Caroline Winterer, American Enlightenments: Pursuing Happiness in the Age of Reason, (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2016), Introduction.  
31 David Wootton, Power, Pleasure, and Profit: Insatiable Appetites from Machiavelli to Madison, 
(Cambridge: Belknap, 2018).  
32 David Wootton, Power, Pleasure, and Profit, Chapter 3-4. Wootton argues that this shift correlated with 
the logic of capitalistic markets to imbue the spirit of competition and endless pursuit into understandings of 
happiness. 
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Conceptions of happiness also intersected with the unique development of a republican 
political culture and economy. It has been persuasively argued that the evolution of economic 
concerns as a result of the commercial revolution helped drive a wedge between Britain and the 
colonies.33 Part of that process involved the development of a distinct approach to political 
economic concerns which fused enlightened beliefs in the power of commerce to reform 
manners and promote virtue with the need for virtue to sustain a republican polity.34 Although 
much emphasis has been placed on Jeffersonian republicanism in this context, Wilson’s thought 
illustrates how active government could be made to support the cultivation of manners in the 
citizenry of a commercial republic. In the intellectual world of the eighteenth century, economic 
concerns were considered as moral issues. Happiness, as an intellectual quantity existed at this 
intersection point and provides an innovative way to consider the republic the founders struggled 
to create.  
 Wilson engaged with happiness in all of these fashions albeit with unequal weight. Like 
other eighteenth century political theorists, Wilson subscribed to the idea that happiness was both 
the end of government and the end of society more generally.35 He believed strongly that 
                                                
33 T. H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American 
Independence, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
34 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980). The commercialization of society engendered strong responses from 
eighteenth century intellectuals ranging in extremes from denunciations of its degrading effects to strong assertions 
of support which eroded the distinction between vice, virtue, and morality. See for example: François Fénelon, 
Telemachus (1699), Patrick Riley ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).; and Bernard Mandeville, 
Fable of the Bees (1723), F.B. Kaye ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924; repr. Indianapolis, 1988). In the American 
context, the founders largely chartered a middle ground, recognizing the necessity of commercial society and the 
benefits it could provide, while also taking steps to ensure that the constitutional structure they devised would limit 
its pernicious effects. This was certainly true of Wilson’s thought. For an example of this kind of approach see: 
Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), F. Oz-Salzberger, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
35 This point was repeated constantly in Wilson’s written works beginning when he was a young man and 
continuing through his law lectures, delivered near the end of his life when he was a Supreme Court justice and one 
of the most eminent jurists in the country.  
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happiness was derived from virtuous conduct and that to be happy one needed to cultivate their 
sense of morality. He also recognized that virtuous conduct resulting in happiness did not come 
naturally but could be instilled, refined, and improved by “habit and by frequent exercise.”36 
Although he emphasized the role cultivating virtue played in happiness, he did not hold that 
happiness referred exclusively to virtue. Instead, it can be said that Wilson viewed happiness in 
terms of individual improvement in all areas: to be happy was to continually strive to be better 
and more prosperous.37 It is also clear that in his private life, as a merchant, politician, and 
leading citizen of Philadelphia, he exhibited the kind of worldly attention to the material that 
Wootton placed at the heart of happiness. Most importantly for our consideration, each of these 
feelings influenced the way he approached government and the development of republican 
society, and in following these strands, Wilson ascribed properly designed government a major 
role in promoting happiness. This relationship is crucial to any understanding of Wilson’s 
thought.  
 The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the ways in which James Wilson’s understanding 
of happiness fundamentally shaped his political thought. As he placed happiness at the pinnacle 
of the human experience, it is not surprising that he developed his theories of political life to be 
in service to the pursuit of happiness. Chapter One will explore Wilson’s upbringing, education, 
and philosophical outlook on life in order to establish an understanding of his motivations and 
the basic underpinnings of his thought. Wilson’s Scottish education led him to a philosophical 
                                                
36 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works of James Wilson, Kermit L. Hall and Mark 
David Hall, ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2007), 512. This belief drove Wilson to heavily consider the 
prospect of individual improvement as a part of republican government. Government was always intended to be in 
the service of individual citizens and that meant providing for their moral improvement.  
37 This vision of happiness shared much with Adam Ferguson’s view that happiness consisted of exerting 
one’s energy to achieve one’s full potential and aid one’s community. Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of 
Civil Society (1767), Section VII-VIII. See also: David Wootton, Power, Pleasure, Profit, 124-125.  
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outlook that differed from many of his colleagues and certainly diverges from popular 
understandings of revolutionary thought today. Any grappling with Wilson as a thinker must 
therefore begin at this basic level.  
Chapter Two will apply Wilson’s philosophical outlook to his work as a thinker and 
pamphleteer during the Imperial Crisis, illustrating that his attachment to happiness drove his 
personal theory of revolution. Much attention has been paid by scholars to the coming of the 
Revolution and many theories for why the event occurred have been offered.38 By foregrounding 
happiness in Wilson’s thought, I show that his motivation for revolution was driven not only by 
the violation of colonial rights by the British Government but also by the British Government’s 
failure to actively promote colonial interests and development. In advocating for revolution, 
Wilson argued not for the negative restriction of government but rather for the positive 
advancement of a specific kind of government grounded in a unique republican approach to 
political economy and his own conception of happiness.  
Chapter Three develops the lasting cornerstone of Wilson’s career: his attention to 
constitutional theory. Beginning in Pennsylvania and then moving forward to the national stage, 
Wilson worked to translate the kind of government he had envisioned during the Revolution into 
reality. More than any other delegate save James Madison, the final Constitution bears Wilson’s 
fingerprints.39 Wilsonian constitutionalism, dedicated to the promotion of happiness, was 
                                                
38 These theories are generally ideological in nature and focus on the constitutional dispute over rights 
between colonists and mother country. More recent work has also incorporated politico-economic arguments as 
well, arguing that the revolution began largely as a specific critique of their place in the empire by American 
colonists. Wilson’s attention to morality could easily be seen as a philosophic reflection of the critiques profiled by 
these imperial minded economic historians: what was important was not only that the British government was 
restricting their rights, but also that they were not doing enough to actively promote colonial interests.  
39 It should also be noted that since the ratification of the constitution both law and popular sentiment have 
moved away from Madison and towards Wilson especially on crucial matters like the direct election of senators and 
the election of the president through the Electoral College.  
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premised on individual consent, active government, and the ability of individuals to improve 
both their physical condition and mental capabilities through participation in republican 
government. Enshrined at the heart of the Constitution, yet underappreciated by scholars, is 
Wilson’s devotion to a republic based on happiness.  
Uncovering Wilson’s “republic of happiness” allows for a reconsideration of the 
Revolution as a whole. Popular understanding of the Revolution often hinges on its supposed 
libertarian qualities: the shackling of government in order to promote the freedom of man. This 
was not Wilson’s revolution. Rather than being devoted to limiting government, Wilson’s 
revolution was devoted to empowering government in specific ways. Rather than seeking to 
liberate man through the promotion of the detached pursuit of self-interest, Wilson sought to 
improve man’s condition by attaching him to the common good and to a common understanding 
of morality consistent with natural law. Attendance to James Wilson’s political thought reveals 
the ways in which the founders envisaged that republican government would lift up the 
conditions of those who participated in it. Wilson believed that “peace and [the] order of society, 
can be obtained only by a system of government.”40 To reach these lofty aspirations, it was 
necessary that government be properly designed, and above all else, be devoted to “the final end 








                                                
40 James Wilson, “Of Government,” in Collected Works, 690.  
41 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 1, 1768 
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Chapter One:  
Happiness’ Foundation  
 
James Wilson was born in the hamlet of Carskerdo in Fifeshire, Scotland in 1742 and 
remained there until 1765 when, aged 23, he departed for Pennsylvania and a new life in the 
colonies. During his time in Scotland, he came of age and through his education formed a 
hardened approach intellectual life. This worldview colored his thought long after he had 
emigrated to the colonies and attained prominence. While a student at the University of St. 
Andrews and then the University of Glasgow, Wilson gained access to the vibrant intellectual 
culture of the Scottish Enlightenment which fundamentally shaped his thought and work during 
the American Revolution. Understanding the intellectual world of James Wilson therefore 
requires an understanding of the Scottish world in which he was trained. The curriculum he 
encountered in Scotland gave Wilson a far different philosophical base than many of his 
contemporaries; one based in common sense philosophy, a particular conception of natural law, 
and above all, a belief in the power of happiness. Throughout his life, he remained devoted to 
these ideals and it is through them that Wilson’s thought is best synthesized.  
The most frequently cited account of Wilson’s upbringing and education comes from 
Charles Page Smith’s 1956 work. With descriptive language verging on the romantic, it 
emphasizes the religious element of Wilson’s early life and erroneously claims that Wilson’s 
only university training was at the University of St. Andrews.1 According to Smith, Wilson’s 
formal education was devoted to preparing for the ministry and he states that it was because of 
the death of his father that he ceased his religious studies and pursued an alternative employment 
                                                
1 Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742-1798, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1956,), 
Chapter 1. Smith’s biography utilizes a style which is far heavier on narrative construction and embellishment of 
detail than it is on rigorous application of analytical historical methods. It also contains a false story that Wilson’s 
father was a leader in a breakaway movement from the Scottish Kirk which Smith uses to make many of his 
assumptions about Wilson’s faith.  
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path. Smith’s account relies almost entirely on one source: a letter from Wilson’s cousin Robert 
Annan which was sent to Wilson’s son Bird in 1805.2 Given that Annan described events which 
had transpired almost 60 years before and that he had departed for America before Wilson left 
St. Andrews, it is unsurprising that the letter contained inaccuracies. Recent scholarship has 
painted a far different picture of Wilson’s life and education in Scotland.  
Wilson’s education was both more intensive and far-reaching than what was relayed in 
Smith’s narrative, a fact which greatly impacts how scholars must consider Wilson as a thinker.3 
More recently discovered evidence reveals that Wilson attended not only St. Andrews, but also 
the University of Glasgow before emigrating to the colonies.4 His background was also far more 
steeped in legal training and natural law philosophy than Smith’s religious narrative portrayed. 
This previously unknown educational chapter of Wilson’s life suggests he possessed a far more 
developed understanding of moral and natural law philosophy prior to his emigration to America.   
The scholarly environment of Glasgow exposed Wilson to a broader range of professors 
and courses than he would have experienced at St. Andrews. While the full record of what he did 
as a student there remains unknown, it is clear that he took classes in divinity, the humanities, 
and natural philosophy.5 In particular, the books he is recorded as signing out suggest he studied 
two philosophical domains which influenced his later thought: Thomas Reid’s Common Sense 
                                                
2 Robert Annan, “Letter to Bird Wilson”, May 16, 1805, Benjamin Rush Papers, 43:133, Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
3 Martin Claggett, “James Wilson—His Scottish Background: Corrections and Additions,” Pennsylvania 
History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 79, no. 2 (2012): 154-76.; and William Ewald, “James Wilson and the 
Scottish Enlightenment,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 4 (2010): 1053-1114. 
4 Martin Claggett, “Scottish Background,” 164-166. Claggett offers signature analysis of the University’s 
library lending lists and stent rolls to show that Wilson attended classes in Glasgow from 1763 into 1765. Claggett 
also notes that it is likely that Wilson served as a clerk in an Edinburgh merchant house, which was also previously 
unknown.  
5 Martin Claggett, “Scottish Background,” 166-173. We do not know Wilson’s exact course through 
Glasgow. After two years of study, students were entitled to attend any lectures free of charge. As a result, book 
receipts and examination fees become a less reliable way to track Wilson’s movements after his second year.  
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school of moral philosophy and natural law philosophy. It is even possible that Wilson attended 
lectures given by Reid, who was on the faculty during a portion of his time at the university. 
Even if he did not attend classes with Reid, it is clear that the foremost thinkers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment weighed directly on Wilson’s formative training.  
The Scottish Enlightenment was one of many regional variations which comprised the 
general corpus of thought now commonly referred to as “the Enlightenment.”6 More than other 
geographically segmented “enlightenments”, the situation of Scotland in the early years of the 
eighteenth century greatly influenced the course of intellectual life in the country.7 Because of 
Scotland’s poor geographic situation and because of its integration into Britain at the beginning 
of the century, Scottish thought had a strong practical bend to it.  Thinkers were highly 
concerned with societal improvement and professionalization, particularly with regards to the 
political economy so as to maximize the prosperity of their country.8 In political economy, and in 
moral philosophy, historiography, religious study, and even geography, the progression of both 
individuals and of society was always Scottish thinkers’ principle goal, something which is 
clearly reflected in the later work of James Wilson.  
Wilson’s training in moral philosophy exerted the greatest influence on his career. The 
dominant school taught in the Scottish universities was the Common Sense school advanced by 
Thomas Reid. Common Sense philosophy was derived from the “moral sense” philosophy of 
                                                
6 Although historians in recent years have questioned the utility of using “the Enlightenment” as an 
encompassing term for a diverse range of philosophical opinions and approaches, I use it here for ease of reference 
and because I share the conviction that although the Enlightenment proceeded differently in different geographic 
localities, the overarching cosmopolitan nature of the ‘republic of letters’ warrants consideration under a single 
framework. See: Ritchie Robertson, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680 – 1790, (New York: Harper, 
2021), xix; and 41. For a full contextualization of Scottish thought during the Enlightenment see: The Cambridge 
Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, Alexander Broadie, ed., (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
7 Alexander Broadie, “Introduction,” in Cambridge Companion, 2-4.  
8 Alexander Broadie, “Introduction,” in Cambridge Companion, 3.  
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Francis Hutcheson. Drawing on a set of influences including the Earl of Shaftesbury and 
Lockean empiricism, Hutcheson argued that humans possess an innate moral sense (treated 
similarly to the physical senses) which allows one to feel pleasure from virtuous conduct.9 It is 
from this moral sense that human beings derive their ideas of virtues, rights, and even natural 
law.  Although not strictly a Common or moral sense theorist, Adam Smith’s system of morals 
based on sympathy shares a similar epistemological base to Hutcheson’s moral sense and 
provided a social justification for the emergence of moral value. Smith established moral conduct 
as the result of a natural desire to “procur[e] pleasure and avoid pain” by “becoming the proper 
objects of…respect,” in the eyes of contemporaries.10 Such esteem is best won through the virtue 
of prudence which leads to “health, fortune, rank, and reputation,” and forms the basis of human 
happiness.11 Given that he held the chair of Moral Philosophy for the first two years of Wilson’s 
time in Glasgow, it is likely that Wilson was familiar with Smith’s theories.  
Thomas Reid, Smith’s successor as the chair of Moral Philosophy, further developed 
Common Sense philosophy, and his body of thought highly influenced James Wilson. Common 
sense, according to Reid, referred to “certain principles…which the constitution of our nature 
leads us to believe and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common 
concerns of life.”12 Contrary to the skepticism of philosophers like Hume, Reid felt that reason 
                                                
9 This characterization derives from Luigi Turco, “Moral Sense and the Foundation of Morals,” in 
Cambridge Companion, 136-141.  
10 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Digireads, 2010), 146.  
11 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 147. Within this section, Smith also develops the idea that 
government needs to play a positive role in cultivating these conditions. This is a sentiment that would later be 
reflected in Wilson’s own work.  
12 Thomas Reid, “An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense,” in Reid, Thomas, 
Inquiry and Essays, Ronald E. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer, eds. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 20. One 
interesting element of Reid’s philosophical method is that he rejects the elitism which normally underscored 
philosophic inquiry at that time. Instead, he argued that his “common sense” theories were how ordinary people (or 
“the vulgar”) experienced philosophical concepts like reason and morality. This relative sympathy to non-elite actors 
would be reflected in Wilson’s more permissive approach to direct democracy later in his career.  
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could build on these principles in order to acquire complex moral knowledge, provided that “all 
reasoning” remain consistent with “first principles.”13 “Morals like all other sciences,” Reid 
wrote, “must have first principles on which all moral reasoning is grounded.”14 Reid held that the 
first principles of morality are simple maxims, similar to self-evident mathematical postulates 
which are innately part of human nature and knowledge. In particular, he argued that these 
senses reflect both the will of God and natural law. “Our moral judgement,” stems “from an 
imperceptible seed planted by our Creator.”15 Furthermore, because moral understanding derives 
from God, it is moral, according to Reid to obey the law of nature as humans understand it.16 
Thus, moral conduct should align human action with the law of nature and the intentions of the 
Divine in the long-run.  
Reid developed his idea of virtuous conduct by drawing on his theory of common sense 
morality, as well as the connection of morality to God and natural law. He stated that virtue 
“consists in living in all good conscience that is, in using the best means in our power to know 
our duty, and acting accordingly.”17 “Duty” in his quote above refers to what most other 
philosophers might call “moral obligation,” which is again an innate part of our moral sense. To 
Reid then, moral action was a question of reasoning –– conduct is judged as either right or wrong 
based on known common principles. That judgment precedes conduct and ultimately ties 
together moral agent and action in a simple system of morality.18 Because morality is a process 
                                                
13 Thomas Reid, “An Inquiry,” 57.  
14 Thomas Reid, “Of Morals,” in Inquiry and Essays, 351.  
15 Thomas Reid, “Of Morals,” 358.  
16 Thomas Reid, “An Inquiry,” 57.  
17 Thomas Reid, “Of Morals,” as quoted in Cambridge Companion, 150.  
18 Luigi Turco, “Moral Sense,” in Cambridge Companion, 150-152.  
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of reason, Reid also held that it “by use… gathers more strength and feels more vigour.”19 Like 
any other skill, it could be improved by instruction and exercise.20 That morality could be 
learned and practiced provided an important part of differentiation –– it implies that steps should 
be taken to help individuals master moral conduct. As seen in his later work, this drive for moral 
improvement strongly influenced the ways in which Wilson considered government and its 
purpose.  
 In addition to learning Reidian common sense, Wilson also absorbed the teachings of 
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui and incorporated Burlamaqui’s notions of happiness and natural law 
into his own understanding of moral philosophy. Burlamaqui’s popularity in moral philosophy 
and natural law curricula at the time, along with Wilson’s frequent citation of him in even his 
earliest published works suggests that Wilson read him as part of his education. Burlamaqui 
thought deeply about the nature of happiness and afforded it a place of prominence in his system 
of moral reasoning. The enduring presence of Burlamaqui in Wilson’s references is a testament 
to the influence that the Swiss thinker had on Wilson’s thought.  
In his Principles of Natural and Politic Law, a popularly assigned textbook at the time, 
Burlamaqui established “true and solid happiness” as the ultimate end of life on Earth.21 
Although peons to happiness were commonplace in eighteenth century rhetoric, Burlamaqui’s 
emphatic placement of happiness  as the pinnacle of the human condition elevated it within his 
thought to a place of even greater prominence: “everything [man] does is with a view of 
happiness.”22 Furthermore, the way in which he joined happiness together with natural law and 
                                                
19 Thomas Reid, “Of Morals,” 359.  
20 Thomas Reid, “Of Morals,” 353.   
21 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, Petter Korman, ed. (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2006), 31.  
22 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 65.  
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political action further differentiates him and makes him especially relevant when piecing 
together Wilson’s own thoughts on these matters.  
 According to Burlamaqui, happiness referred to “internal satisfaction of the mind, arising 
from the possession of good [meaning] whatever is suitable or agreeable to man for his 
preservation, perfection, convenience, or pleasure.” 23 From this definition, we can draw out 
several important elements. First, happiness, rather than being a fleeting emotional condition, is 
instead a more permanent state, defined by a sense of “internal satisfaction” or contentment. 
Second, that state of satisfaction is defined in moral terms drawn from the moral quantity 
“good.” Based on the characteristics he associates with good, happiness can be split along 
different dimensions: one in more metaphysical terms based on the idea of moral perfection, and 
the other in more tangible terms associated with self-preservation and the pursuit of pleasure.24 
Thus, according to Burlamaqui, happiness remained both an individual moral quantity as well as 
a condition that could be fully realized in society only as society exists in the moment.25  
 The way Burlamaqui believed individuals can achieve happiness drew on philosophical 
assumptions similar to those expressed in Reid’s Common Sense theories. First, Burlamaqui 
recognized that as happiness is deemed by God to be man’s ultimate end, the pursuit of 
happiness must be consistent with natural law, which he defines as “a law that God imposes on 
all men… [which they know] by the sole light of reason, and by attentively considering their 
                                                
23 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 40. Unlike many other writers who referenced “happiness” without 
definition, Burlamaqui provides a succinct and direct definition of the term which is enormously useful in 
understanding its eighteenth-century usage.  
24 Burlamaqui gives room for the expression of self-love within his conceptions of pleasure and happiness. 
Although he does not take a full Mandevillian stance that self-love is an absolute good, he does avoid the harsh 
criticism often direct towards the concept by many eighteenth-century thinkers. Instead, he recognizes that self-love 
is imparted to man by the Creator and is thus incorporated into natural law. See: Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, 
Principles, 66.  
25 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 152.   
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state and nature.”26 At the individual level, Burlamaquian natural law morality coincides with 
Reid’s general concept of morality. Like Reid, Burlamaqui believed man is equipped with an 
innate moral sense which “imprint[s] within us a sense or taste of virtue or justice.”27 Reason 
exists as a further refinement of the moral sense that improves one’s ability to discern the true 
principles of natural law.28 These principles of natural law, like common sense principles, should 
be “simple, clear, sufficient, and proper.”29 Burlamaqui also advocated for the individual ability 
to increase their happiness through improved moral reasoning.30 He felt that the most direct way 
for individuals to achieve lasting happiness was to align their actions with natural law as 
discovered through moral instinct and right reason.  
 Burlamaqui did, however, add a complicating element to this basic conceptualization of 
the moral quantity of happiness by noting that self-love plays an important role in securing 
individual happiness.  Self-love, he wrote, “may serve for the first principle with regard to the 
duties which concern man himself.”31 While many eighteenth-century philosophers decried the 
corrosive force of self-love in society and only a small number cheered its influence, 
Burlamaqui’s position is shaded with subtlety; self-love can play an important role in securing 
happiness, but only to the degree that “it is directed by right reason, according to…our nature 
and state.”32 The need for preservation and pleasure necessitates some degree of self-interest in 
human conduct and also introduces the possibility that societal gain (understood largely through 
                                                
26 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 123.  
27 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 140. 
28 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 142. 
29 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 145.  
30 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 151.  
31 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 150. 
32 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 150-151.  
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the accumulation of property) plays a role in the continuation of happiness. This only holds, 
however, for as long as self-interest does not conflict the established tenants of natural law.  
 In Burlamaqui’s system, society also played an important role in the realization of man’s 
happiness. He began by demonstrating the ways in which man’s nature is necessarily suited to 
living in a society. As a result of this natural dependence, “out of society [man] could neither 
preserve his life, nor display and perfect his faculties and talents, nor attain any real and solid 
happiness.”33 In order to obtain happiness then, man must act with the virtues of “sociability,” or 
“benevolence towards our fellow creatures.”34 The collective nature of happiness is often 
overlooked when considering the topic. In order to fulfill the tenants of natural law and achieve 
the status of mind that Burlamaqui considered “happy,” one must “never pursue their private 
advantage to the prejudice of the public.” Instead, “the public good should be the supreme rule of 
their conduct.”35 Man must act in a benevolent way which benefits the common good, so long as 
doing so does not harm his immediate self. Doing so is the key to lasting happiness.   
Burlamaqui thought deeply about how society and government should interact to support 
man’s happiness. According to him, government existed to give structure to the law of nature 
and societal happiness formed the root of political obligation. 36 A superior can govern, he said, 
“only in order to render [their subjects] happy.”37 Without that dedication to happiness, no 
lasting obligation can be formed. Although much attention is given to the role of liberty in 
eighteenth century political thought, especially with regards to the American Revolution, 
                                                
33 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 152.  
34 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 155.  
35 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 156.  
36 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 193-200.  
37 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 158.  
 24 
Burlamaqui establishes liberty as a means and not as an end: “the maintenance and security of 
the liberty of mankind,” is beneficial because it allows man to “enjoy a solid happiness.”38  
Given that Burlamaqui had formulated the concept of happiness in moral terms, his declaration 
that the end of politics must be happiness suggests that politics should be understood in moral 
terms. And, just as individuals should strive to improve their moral reasoning, and as society 
should strive to fully support individuals’ moral fitness, so too should politics be a force for 
moral improvement.  
 Over the course of his education, Wilson gained access to some of the most relevant 
intellectual work available and developed a specific intellectual approach which married together 
general Enlightenment principles with the specific concepts of common-sense moral reasoning 
and natural law theory as exemplified by thinkers like Thomas Reid and Jean-Jacques 
Burlamaqui. Emphasizing this philosophical basis provides a more innovative framework for 
considering Wilson’s later work beyond commonly cited works often associated with the 
political theory of the American Revolution and theories of American Constitutionalism. 
Wilsonian politics, with common sense philosophy and natural rights jurisprudence at its core, 
centered on the advancement of individuals as the prime goal of political life. Wilson saw 
politics as a force for moral improvement and believed that a carefully crafted republic would 
best support the individual pursuit of happiness. His devotion to this specific formulation of 
politics is evident in his published works as well as in his actions as both a revolutionary and a 
framer of governments throughout the 1770s and 80s.  
 Wilson’s first published pieces, the “Visitant Essays,” provide a fascinating insight into 
                                                
38 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principles, 283-284.  
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how his education shaped his worldview.39 Written for the Pennsylvania Chronicle in 1768, the 
essays can be stylistically compared to more popular works like Addison’s Spectator essays and 
even Franklin’s “Silence Doogood Letters.” They are presented from the point of view of the 
eponymous “Visitant” character offering advice and proffering views to readers, and touch on 
subjects ranging from morality, law, and politics to sociability and gender.40 Wilson-as-the-
Visitant is a fundamentally optimistic figure, “inclined,” in his own words, “to view everything 
in the most agreeable light.”41 Like others who wrote similar columns, Wilson relied heavily on a 
particular constructed notion of gentility, composed of “an agreeable mixture of sense and 
delicacy” when crafting his character. At times playful (such as when he claims to “prefer the 
conversation of a fine woman to that of a philosopher”) and at other times scholarly, the Visitant 
essays bear the mark of a man still seeking to define himself in the world –– possessing the 
intellect and ambition of a serious thinker yet still touched with the enjoyment and worldly 
fascination of youth.  
Although the subject matter of the essays vacillates between lighthearted reflections on 
life and more serious scholarly explorations, Wilson established a view of man and of morality 
which fundamentally mirrored his education. In the first essay, published on February 1, 1768, 
                                                
39 Wilson co-authored the essays with his friend William White. As it is accepted that they wrote the pieces 
cooperatively and there is no way to distinguish either’s individual contributions, I will largely refer to the ideas of 
the essays as “Wilson’s” to maintain ease of style.  
40 Wilson’s treatment of gender in the Visitant essays is particularly interesting. In general, he is far more 
supportive of the “Fair Sex,” than his contemporaries, and noted that they are a source of “great improvement, as 
well as pleasure” for society. These sentiments have even led one scholar to suggest Wilson was a “feminist,” 
although the infancy of that term leads him to decline to label Wilson explicitly. (See: Nicholas Pedersen, “The Lost 
Founder: James Wilson in American Memory,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 22, no. 2 (2010): 259.) While 
this is likely an overblown assertion (Wilson shared many common stereotypes of the time which denigrated 
women) his relatively liberal stance on gender issues points to his liberal and optimistic approach to human nature in 
general. For Wilson’s own views see “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, 
February 15, 1768.  
41 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 1, 1768.  
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the Visitant established “happiness,” as “the final end of our existence.”42 Like Reid and 
Burlamaqui, the Visitant equated happiness with morality and virtue discovered through “the 
conduct and sentiments of a good man.”43 Although not expressed in as detailed a manner, this 
phrasing mirrored Burlamaqui’s own assertion that happiness is equated with “living good” as 
directed by natural law. The Visitant’s approach to moral reasoning, and thus happiness and 
natural law, remained Reidian in outlook –– although he held that many moral truths are 
complex facts only arrived at through a less than perfect process of reasoning, he maintained that 
“the most important moral truths are discovered not by reasoning, but by that act of the mind 
which I have called perception,” meaning Reid’s common moral sense.44 At a basic level, the 
Visitant’s view of moral philosophy hewed closely to the values Wilson learned in Scotland.  
In developing a specific theory of virtue, he further clarified the moral conduct at the 
heart of happiness. The Visitant defined virtue as socially constructed, and to him, the arch-
virtue was “politeness,” or “the natural and grateful expression of the social virtues.” By 
politeness, he referred to a combination of agreeable traits including modesty, discretion, 
honesty, and sympathy.45 In crafting the relationship between politeness, society, and happiness, 
he drew on both Burlamaqui and Adam Smith’s notions of human nature. “Men are not naturally 
wolves to men,” he insisted and, paralleling Smith’s idea of sympathy, he claimed “they were 
made to assist…one another.”46 Moral conduct, according to the Visitant, consisted of a pattern 
                                                
42 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 1, 1768. 
43 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 1, 1768. 
44 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, April 25, 1768. 
45 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 22, 1768. Together 
these traits comprise a particular notion of gentility. The Visitant rejects the idea of mere fashion as gentility and 
instead states that gentility is related to moral quality and action: “when a fashion is used by people of quality, we 
think it genteel.”   
46 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 22, 1768. 
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of action towards fellow men; a recognition and fellow-feeling for the shared sentiments of 
others coupled with discrete social interactions meant to express empathy for those conditions. 
By acting with sympathy toward one another, human being’s “enjoyments might be multiplied; 
and the pleasure which arises from them, might be increased.”47 Here, Wilson identified a 
connection between virtuous conduct and the enjoyment of human happiness: it is natural, he 
wrote, for human nature to be “formed for society.” Therefore, human pleasures must be realized 
through society.48  
Wilson’s essays reveal how he applied the values of his education to the society he lived 
in as well as how those values related to wider intellectual movements during the eighteenth 
century. He shared much with eighteenth-century sentimentalists who constructed an 
understanding of the world based on perception, the sympathetic self, and the intertwinement of 
reasoning and emotion.49 In the Visitant, Wilson acknowledged that happiness (through moral 
knowledge) “cannot be obtained without being acquainted with…sentiments and affections” 
while “insensibility degrades [human] nature, by preventing the exertion of some of [humanity’s] 
best affections.”50 Wilson’s thought evoked the arguments made by a class of eighteenth century 
thinkers identified as “sentimentalists.” During the Revolution, sentimentalists utilized their 
                                                
47 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 22, 1768. 
48 In one sense, Wilson follows the tradition of thinkers like Mandeville who cast human society as the 
arena in which happiness could be realized. However, Wilson differs sharply from the Mandevillean approach by 
recognizing empathy between persons as well as the impact society could and should have on individual virtue. 
These positions kept Wilson from articulating a vision of happiness entirely predicated on self-interest.  
49 Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2008), 5. Knott argues 
that sentimental thinkers utilized the Imperial Crisis to make arguments for societal reformation in order to better 
serve the self. Although far more political than the sentimentalists tracked by Knott, Wilson shared a similar outlook 
on the potential of the Revolution for crafting newly improved patterns of self-refinement.   
50 “For the Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, February 1, 1768.; “For the 
Pennsylvania Chronicle. The Visitant” Pennsylvania Chronicle, April 18, 1768.  
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particular sense of the self to argue for societal reform.51 The overarching goal of sentimental 
thought was to respond to the pressures of commercial society in the eighteenth century in order 
to improve mankind’s sociability and sense of virtue. Although the essays do not directly 
advocate those positions, Wilson adopted sentimentalist outlooks and language and shared their 
thirst for human improvement. Throughout his career, his approach to politics and the law 
mirrored this vision of moral improvement through the cultivation of the individual.  
While the ideas present in the Visitant series are somewhat unrefined, Wilson’s 
construction of a system of moral reasoning illustrates how he approached the nature of man, 
morality, and society. It is clear that he fully adopted much of what he was taught in Scotland; 
sharing key assumptions about the nature of moral philosophy from the common-sense school as 
well as from Burlamaqui’s marriage of morality, happiness, and natural law. He was 
fundamentally optimistic in outlook, believing man to be generally good and capable of moral 
improvement. By locating virtue in societal action through the concept of politeness, Wilson 
suggested that virtue and by extension happiness are realized as part of a societal process. These 
concepts are not politicized in the essays, and in fact Wilson and White make little mention of 
politics throughout them. However, they do provide a foundational understanding of the world 
which Wilson politicized during the Revolution through a particular skein of republicanism 
devoted to the promotion of individual moral improvement and happiness. In the Visitant essays, 
Wilson’s intellectual devotion to happiness is clearly evident.  
If the Visitant essays illustrate the ways in which Wilson’s education immediately shaped 
his interactions with the world, then his law lectures, which represent the culmination of his 
intellectual work, are illustrative of the ways in which his education molded his intellectual 
                                                
51 Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, 15-22.   
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approach across his career.52 The lectures were designed by Wilson to be published as a 
foundational exploration of American law, in order to make him an “American Blackstone.”53 To 
facilitate their publication, Wilson edited and compiled final drafts of each lecture after he 
delivered them to his students.54 The lectures touched on a variety of subjects, including moral 
philosophy and natural law, criminal and civil law, and a comparative history of American 
constitutionalism. Although they were not published until after his death, Wilson’s law lectures 
represent the most comprehensive articulation of his thought, providing us with a clear picture of 
how his understanding of happiness and moral philosophy remained foundational to his work.  
As with the Visitant essays, the philosophical approach evident in the law lectures clearly 
bears the mark of his education in Scotland. Both Reid and Burlamaqui are cited heavily 
throughout the sections on the nature of man and natural law respectively and, moreover, Wilson 
continued to adopt their fundamental approaches in his own exploration of related issues. This is 
not to say that Wilson offers nothing original, but rather acknowledging this relationship grounds 
our understanding of Wilson’s work in the wider context of his education and the ideas he 
adopted from it so as to fully appreciate the web of influence he operated in.  
Common Sense philosophy continued to influence his thought. During his lecture on 
natural law, he instructed his students that moral philosophy stems from an innate moral sense 
“capable of culture and improvement by habit, and by frequent and extensive exercise.”55 From 
                                                
52 Wilson’s law lectures were delivered beginning in 1790 at the College of Philadelphia (today’s 
University of Pennsylvania) while Wilson served on the Supreme Court. 
53 Mark David Hall, “Bibliographical Essay History of James Wilson’s Law Lectures,” in Collected Works 
of James Wilson, Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2007), 401. Despite his 
hopes for their reception, Wilson’s ignominious death combined with the decline of Federalist politics blunted any 
hope for their impact. They were published quietly in 1804 by Wilson’s son Bird. 
54 Mark David Hall, “Bibliographical Essay,” in Collected Works, 401-413.  
55 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works, 512.  
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this moral sense, “first principles, which derive not their evidence from any antecedent 
principles” are isolated to form the basis of moral conduct. The entire process, he said, is more 
analogous “to the perceptions of sense than to the conclusions of reasoning.”56 These were 
fundamentally Reidian notions. However, as evidenced by the specific lecture in which Wilson 
delivered these sentiments, he follows Burlamaqui and ties moral philosophy to man’s God-
given nature and thus identifies moral conduct with natural law.57 Wilson felt that natural law 
was the clearest source of obligation that humanity must obey.58 Thus, political obligation and 
laws made by men must always be made in accordance with natural law. By equating moral 
philosophy with the natural law, he suggests that political institutions must be in accordance with 
the tenets of morality and must share their end. That prime end of both moral reasoning and 
human life is, of course, the pursuit and realization of human happiness.  
Throughout the law lectures, Wilson dealt more forcefully with the idea of happiness, 
which while clearly important to his philosophical beliefs (given that he cites it as man’s ultimate 
end) received glancing coverage in the Visitant essays. Wilson primarily accounted for 
individuals realizing their own happiness through actions taken in society –– “take away society, 
and you destroy the basis, on which the preservation and happiness of human life are laid.”59 
This basis is generally provided by the “mutual services and sympathetic pleasures,” generated 
by society, which give man the security and peace needed for further refinement and 
                                                
56 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works, 513.  
57 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works, 517. 
58 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works, 500.  
59 James Wilson, “Of Man, As a Member of Society,” in Collected Works, 631.  
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perfection.60 Private happiness was, for Wilson, primarily about internalizing these virtues. To be 
happy was to live a life according to these first principles of virtue.  
Wilson acknowledged both private and public forms of happiness tied to virtue and 
individual character. Private happiness resulted from acting with character and cultivating a 
strong sense of virtue at the individual level. Public happiness was the result of a government 
founded on virtue, fostering virtue in individuals, and giving individuals the needed freedom and 
latitude to pursue virtuous living. To be happy in the mind of James Wilson was to live in 
accordance with natural law which would ultimately lead to prosperity in life. The “glorious 
destiny of man” says Wilson, “is to be always [progressing]” towards this perfection.61 The 
progressive nature imbued into his thought by the implications of natural law as a theoretical 
term is typical of the enlightenment spirit and gives meaning to the “pursuit” of happiness well 
outside the bounds of self-interest often cited by historians when addressing that phrase.  
He also interacted more directly with moral philosophy and happiness as politicized 
concepts than he did in the Visitant essays. In order for society to exist and fulfill its purposes, he 
noted, government is required. Although Wilson believed society to be antecedent to 
government, he also believed government played an important role in the success of society.62 
Government primarily exists to provide a framework to support the conditions needed for society 
to successfully function. Because the primary end of society is happiness, “the promotion of 
publick happiness [was] the end originally proposed by the people” for government.63 “Without 
                                                
60 James Wilson, “Of Man, As a Member of Society,” in Collected Works, 630-633. This phrase also 
implicitly reveals much about what Wilson cast as the purpose of government. Existing in a state of security and 
peace were the most basic ingredients of the pursuit of happiness. Thus, for government to ensure individual 
happiness, government needed to provide security and peace.   
61 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works, 524.  
62 James Wilson, “Of Government,” in Collected Works, 690-717.  
63 James Wilson, “Of Government,” in Collected Works, 692.  
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government,” Wilson determined, “society in the present state of things, cannot flourish, far less 
can it reach perfection,” meaning that experiencing happiness is heavily linked to government.64  
The politicization of happiness, by ascribing the success or failure of happiness in society 
to government, shaped the way Wilson approached political problems. If societal happiness 
could not exist without government, and if societal happiness depended on the cultivation of 
individual virtues, then government must be designed to cultivate virtue within individual 
citizens in order to survive. The reverse of this process, that degeneracy in government would 
lead to a “consequent degeneracy of the people,” highlights the profound relationship Wilson 
developed between governmental form and happiness and the reciprocal relationship between 
good government and public happiness.65 Wilson thought deeply about politics and that thought 
was profoundly shaped by his conception of happiness. An understanding of Wilsonian political 
theory must stem from an understanding of happiness as he conceptualized it.  
 Perhaps because of its importance to his thought, Wilson recognized that the situation of 
happiness was precarious. He knew that the blessings of good government could easily be 
destroyed by lack of “education, by prejudice, by interest, by ambition.”66 However, Wilson also 
remained optimistic for the American future. As a lawyer and legal theorist heavily trained in the 
natural law, Wilson adopted a conception of happiness closely linked with natural law.67 He 
believed universal first principles of morality derived from natural law and when acted upon, 
stimulated happiness. Virtuous conduct resulting in happiness did not come naturally but could 
                                                
64 James Wilson, “Of Government,” in Collected Works, 690.  
65 James Wilson, “Of Government,” in Collected Works, 692.  
66 James Wilson, “Of Government,” in Collected Works, 692.  
67 For more on this specific relationship in the eighteenth century, see: Carli N. Conklin, The Pursuit of 
Happiness in the Founding Era, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2019).  
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be instilled, refined, and improved through moral conduct and education.68 Most importantly, 
these conditions would result from a properly devised republican government giving men the 
freedom “to pursue [their] own perfection and happiness”69 Because of the blessings of 
republican government, he saw reason to think that each of the threats to happiness could be 
surmounted and that the American republic would provide the platform for the continued 
progression of happiness. 
To say that Wilson believed the support of happiness was the supreme purpose of 
government suggests that republican government should be centered on individual improvement 
and perfection. In keeping with his adherence to common sense philosophy, happiness and 
morality were treated by Wilson as objective quantities with defined meanings. These meanings 
provided the baseline for what government should be and do. Utilizing these baselines, and 
understanding government as predicated on happiness leads to far different conclusions about 
government than if the baselines of libertarian sensibilities of freedom or the safeguarding of 
liberty through the expulsion of corruption are adopted.  
James Wilson’s education was primarily grounded in moral philosophy and the study of 
natural law. Through his study at the University of St. Andrews and the University of Glasgow, 
he was exposed to influential ideas including Thomas Reid’s theories of common sense and 
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui’s conception of natural law. These ideas continued to provide a 
foundation to Wilson’s writing throughout his life. As a result, it is important to consider his later 
work in the Revolution within this lens of influence. Foregrounding happiness as a political 
virtue allows us to see a different path for the intellectual elements of the Revolution not 
                                                
68 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works, 512.   
69 James Wilson, “Of the Law of Nature,” in Collected Works, 503.  
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captured by traditional approaches. This new path is replete with different goals and definitions 
of success. Following it gives us a better appreciation for what it means to be citizens within a 
republic. It provides a different context of understanding for political aspirations and outcomes 
than those so often associated with the American experience: uncontrolled individual freedom, 
rampant individualism, and the self-interested pursuit of near limitless property. At its heart, 
Wilsonian republicanism, through happiness, is centered on the improvement and advancement 




































James Wilson emigrated to America in the fall of 1765. In the ten years following his 
arrival, he grew from new immigrant and humble law student to become one of the leading 
spokespersons for the American cause. Although he served as a revolutionary organizer, delegate 
to the Continental Congress, and even for a brief time as a militia colonel in Cumberland County, 
he was most successful as a rhetorician and political and legal theorist.1 As one of the best 
educated and most scholarly-inclined members of the Founding generation, Wilson thought 
deeply about the political changes occurring around him and the philosophy of revolution he 
offered in response to those changes provides considerable insight into both his own mindset and 
to the Revolution more generally.  
At a fundamental level, his work during the Imperial Crisis and Revolution was grounded 
in the intellectual framework he had developed in Scotland. His theory of revolution and 
expectations for government were developed in accordance with his thoughts on natural law and 
human society. Both were dictated by his understanding of happiness. To comprehend why 
James Wilson became a revolutionary, one must incorporate his understandings of happiness into 
his political writings. Doing so adds new context to his writings and challenges certain 
interpretations of both his work at an individual level and of the Revolution more generally.  
Wilson’s role in the Revolution is understudied and underappreciated. In less specialized 
works, Wilson appears as the “great footdragger” of independence” –– referring to his late 
support of Independence without considering the theoretical underpinnings of that decision.2 Of 
                                                
1 Like most major world events, the Revolution proceeded along a number of dimensions including 
economic, societal, and intellectual. This chapter, because of Wilson’s own focus, considers the evolution of 
political thought as the locus of revolutionary activity.  
2 Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence, (New York: Vintage, 
1998), 27. This kind of coverage parallels Wilson’s undeserved historiographical reputation as an anti-democratic 
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the frameworks formed from specific facets of Wilson’s thought, only one, developed by George 
Dennison, directly tackles Wilson’s conception of “revolution” as a theoretical concept. The 
article notes the importance that revolutionary theory held in Wilson’s intellectual world, while 
arguing that his notion of “consent” drove his intellectual approach to revolution. The logic 
behind this relationship stems from his conception of man and society: society and government 
are formed for man’s benefit. When they do not meet that purpose (and thus people do not 
consent to them), people have a right to overthrow that government and institute new forms.3 
Dennison argues that this theory holds the key to understanding Wilsonian thought throughout 
the Revolutionary period.  
While this framework has merit, substituting the concept of happiness raises questions 
regarding its more legalistic conclusions. Within Wilsonian political thought, happiness provides 
the most effective window through which to understand the intellectual outcomes of the 
American Revolution. Thus, understanding connections between revolution and securing 
happiness has considerable import when analyzing the American struggle for independence and 
shifts attention from the limiting language of protection of rights to a more expansive 
consideration of the ways in which government can positively influence its citizens’ lives.4 This 
relationship provides a new avenue for understanding not only the causes of the Revolution, but 
also its ultimate outcomes and purpose.  
                                                
conservative. The pattern of thought which underlay his decisions in Congress leading up to the vote on 
independence will be covered in the latter portion of this chapter.  
3 George M. Dennison, “The ‘Revolution Principle’: Ideology and Constitutionalism in the Thought of 
James Wilson,” The Review of Politics 39, no. 2 (1977): 157-91.  
4 While certainly important, the concept of liberty and the protection of personal freedoms have received 
almost monopolistic coverage in revolutionary historiography, particularly in more popular accounts. This has been 
a detriment to both understandings of other elements of the revolutionary experience and to understandings of the 
event as a whole. 
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Questions of causality remain at the heart of Revolutionary historiography. Much of that 
intellectual work has utilized the approach found in Bernard Bailyn’s Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution and the “republican synthesis” that it engendered.5 Bailyn’s revisionary 
treatment drew upon earlier consensus histories and sought to return to the world of ideas by 
carefully reading Revolutionary rhetoric and taking it as a genuine statement of colonial beliefs. 6 
In doing so, Bailyn came to see the Revolution as “above all else, an ideological, constitutional, 
political struggle and not primarily a controversy between social groups.”7 The concept of 
ideology was crucial to Bailyn’s analysis and he defines ideology as the matrix through which 
ideas are given meaning.8 According to Bailyn, it was colonial development of ideologies 
divergent from those found in Britain which drove the revolution.  
Those who utilize an ideological lens generally cite two competing ideologies, classical 
republicanism and liberalism, as defining Revolutionary-era thought. The contours of classical 
republicanism in its American context were laid out by Bailyn and developed by other associated 
                                                
5 For works representative of the “republican synthesis” see: Pauline Maier, From Resistance to 
Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776, (New York: 
Knopf, 1972).; Robert E. Shalhope, “Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of 
Republicanism in American Historiography.” The William and Mary Quarterly 29, no. 1 (1972): 49-80.; and Gordon 
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1969.) 
6 For a full discussion of the American Revolution’s historiography, see Michael Hattem, “The American 
Revolution’s Historiography,” Journal of the American Revolution, August 27, 2013.  As he notes, consensus 
historians, writing within the context of the Cold War, generally reacted negatively to the conflict-driven style of 
earlier progressive historians. Instead, they looked for points of agreement among the revolutionary generation. One 
particularly relevant contribution from the consensus era is the emphasis placed on the political philosophy of John 
Locke. See: Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since 
the Revolution, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955). For examples of progressive-style arguments see: 
Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1913).; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, (New York: Longmans, 
Green, and Company, 1917).  
7 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 50th Anniversary ed., (Cambridge: 
Belknap, 2017), xxviii.  
8 Bailyn’s definition of ideology largely followed that articulated by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. See: 
Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in David Apter, ed. Ideology and Discontent (Free Press, 1964), 
47-56.  
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historians.9 They argue that above all, the revolution was driven by classically inspired fears that 
corruption and conspiracy in Britain were eroding the moral health of the American body politic 
in order to “enslave” the colonies and deprive them of their liberty. In contrast, liberalism, as 
developed by historians like Joyce Appleby, is described largely as an ideological outgrowth of 
the formation of capitalist economic structures. This development created a “disjuncture in 
colonial life in the second half of the eighteenth century” which gave rise to a “frenzied 
apprehensiveness to Parliamentary efforts to enforce imperial controls, and [also explains] why 
liberalism with its core affirmation of the individual's claim upon society to protect his natural 
rights could so easily have displaced the devotion to order which animated colonial life a half 
century earlier.”10 In contrast to republicanism, those who argued that the Revolution was 
primarily liberal in character cited a desire to protect individual liberties as well as a move 
towards democratic capitalist society as its primary features.   
The intellectual debate between republicanism and liberalism ended in a soft consensus. 
Classical republican notions persisted into the supposedly liberal Early Republic and nascent 
liberal thought lived happily in the classical republican world of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century.  Given that both ideologies existed at the time, and were available for use by 
thinkers, the idea of a hard distinction between republicanism and liberalism can no longer be 
maintained. Rather than conceptualizing ideology as a series of discrete categories, it is better to 
utilize a “sliding scale model,” which recognizes that individual thinkers adopted elements of 
both traditions into their philosophical visions. In recent years, some historians have declared 
                                                
9 Although Bailyn was the first to heavily apply these ideas to the American situation, he himself drew on 
the work of a number of other scholars who studied Early Modern Britain and Europe. See: Robert Shalhope, 
“Toward a Republican Synthesis,” 51-56.  
10 Joyce Appleby, “Liberalism and the American Revolution,” The New England Quarterly 49, no. 1 
(1976), 7. See also: Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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republicanism and liberalism “dead” as useful terms for analysis of the Revolution.11 While this 
position is overstated, it does point to problems with the republicanism-liberalism split and 
suggests a need for new frameworks to understand the true causes of the Revolution.  
More recent works that explore the intellectual dimension of the Revolution provide these 
new insights and a much-needed intervention into the dominant ideological interpretation by 
focusing on how understandings of morality shaped the Revolutionary process.12 As noted by C. 
Bradley Thompson, “the history of human events is, for better or worse, the history of men and 
women acting according to a conception of what they think is good, right, just, and true.”13 To 
fully understand what drove people to act during the Revolution, it is critical that one 
understands not only their ideals and political allegiances but also the moral principles and world 
views which spawned them. The argument Thompson makes is deceptively simple yet 
satisfyingly complex: at an intellectual level, the American Revolution was moral in character 
and moral reasoning and principles like happiness were an essential factor in its progression. 
Colonists, Thompson argues, evolved a particular sense of morality, (heavily influenced by the 
Enlightenment and, according to Thompson, especially John Locke) centered around the ideas of 
equality and natural rights.14 This new conception of morality then became a yardstick against 
which British conduct was judged during the imperial crisis and an ideal around which the 
                                                
11 Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making 
of the American State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 39. 
12 See: C. Bradley Thompson, America's Revolutionary Mind: A Moral History of the American Revolution 
and the Declaration That Defined It, (New York: Encounter Books, 2019), Craig Bruce Smith, American Honor: 
The Creation of the Nation's Ideals during the Revolutionary Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2018).; and Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2008). Smith and 
Knott, while making important contributions, fail to offer a unified theory for revolutionary behavior. Instead, they 
illustrate how specific patterns of thought (honor and sentimentalism) developed during the Revolution and how 
those patterns of thought contributed to particular facets of the revolutionary experience.  
13 C. Bradley Thompson, America's Revolutionary Mind, 8.  
14 C. Bradley Thompson, America’s Revolutionary Mind, various, see esp.: Chapter 1: 11-14 and 32-34. 
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founders structured the New Republic.15 As they continued to find that Britain’s conduct clashed 
with their new conceptions of morality, nascent revolutionaries agitated for reform and then 
finally for separation from Britain. To evaluate this process, Thompson utilizes what he calls the 
“new moral history” method which centers discussion on intellectual development from moral 
reasoning to moral principles, to motives, and finally, to action.16 He argues that this chain of 
intellectual output to tangible outcomes is essential to understanding the wider contours of the 
period. Where Thompson errs, however, is in his insistence that this revolutionary mind was 
singularly devoted to the protection of individual rights through the limitation of government 
power. In limiting the Enlightenment mind to Locke, Thompson minimalizes the numerous ways 
in which thought was devoted to human improvement.17 By supplementing Thompson’s 
argument with a careful reading of Wilson’s thought it can be shown that the “moral revolution” 
could also be used to support an active government –– one which acted and intervened to aid the 
individual pursuit of happiness.  
This new moral lens does not fully contradict the work of scholars like Bailyn. 
Understanding ideological forces and the language Bailyn uncovered is still a critical part of 
evaluating political phenomena. However, the moral approach to the Revolution does open new 
avenues for study and offers new insights into the intellectual aspects of the Revolution. It shifts 
our focus from the strong neo-Whig emphasis on classical virtue and deep-seated fears of 
conspiracy to a more universalized discussion of man, nature, their relationship, and the laws that 
                                                
15 C. Bradley Thompson, America’s Revolutionary Mind, xi-9; 80-83.  
16 C. Bradley Thompson. "The American Revolution and the New Moral History." American Political 
Thought (Chicago, Ill.) 8, no. 2 (2019): 175-201. 
17 It has been argued persuasively by Ritchie Robertson that happiness provides the best overarching metric 
for evaluating the Enlightenment. See: Ritchie Robertson, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680 – 
1790, (New York: Harper, 2021), Preface and Chapter I.  
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held the entire system together. Such an approach offers historians an understanding of the 
Revolution’s meaning which better connects the causes, course, and consequences of 
revolutionary activity. Following the idealistic strands inherent in the Revolution allows one to 
see the connective tissue between the descent into revolution in the 1760s and the emergence of a 
new republican society in the 1780s, 1790s, and beyond. In short, it makes a holistic evaluation 
of the Revolution’s purpose and proceedings both easier and more meaningful.  
Raised and educated in the crucible of the Scottish Enlightenment, James Wilson’s theory 
of revolution is best understood utilizing this new moral paradigm rather than Bailyn’s 
ideological lens. In fact, Wilson is an exemplar of the shortcomings of ideology as an analytic 
lens. The ideological tenor of his thought has often proved beguiling to those who have studied 
him. At different times, Wilson has been characterized as variously “nationalist or conservative 
or democrat…radical, moderate, liberal, aristocrat, pragmatist, realist, optimist, and 
combinations thereof.”18 Part of this semantic confusion emanates from Wilson’s varied career, 
which encompassed events in both local and national contexts and stretched across the majority 
of the revolutionary period. However, such facts also describe the careers of many of the 
founders –– John Adams and Thomas Jefferson are excellent exemplars –– who can be more 
reliably labeled on an ideological axis. Wilson’s thought reads as from a lost intellectual world, 
one where politics was still considered to be a moral science and one where thinkers still sought 
to uncover the hand of God in the universe by uncovering universal principles and systems. In 
order to fully understand him, one must move beyond ideology and instead consider the world as 
                                                
18 Morton M. Rosenburg, “In Search of James Wilson” in Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic 
Studies, Vol. 55, No. 3 (July, 1988), 108.  
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James Wilson was taught to: in moral terms. Doing so opens new approaches to synthesizing his 
work in a meaningful way.  
The years following Wilson’s arrival in the colonies were some of the most pivotal in all 
of American history. In 1763, two years before Wilson arrived, the end of the Seven Years War 
ushered in a new era of British imperial organization wherein its government sought to exert 
greater direct control over colonial policy in order to generate increased revenues for a depleted 
imperial treasury.19 Just prior to Wilson’s arrival in 1765, news of the Stamp Act arrived in the 
colonies, igniting a torrent of debate and calls for imperial reform from the colonies.20 Although 
Parliament repealed the Stamp Act after a flurry of colonial protests, the decay of Anglo-
American relations continued until the Declaration of Independence was passed in July 1776.21 
Over that eleven-year period, subsequent pieces of legislation, including the Declaratory Act, the 
Townshend Duties, and the Coercive Acts, as well as events including the Boston Massacre, the 
burning of HMS Gaspée, and the Boston Tea Party inflamed tensions and drove the colonies 
further from Great Britain. As part of that process, colonists began discussing and reconsidering 
the constitutional nature of their place in the Empire as well as wider topics including man’s 
natural rights and the role and purpose of revolution in public life.  
                                                
19 Numerous histories have chronicled the events prior to the Revolution. For a particularly innovative 
study of the ways in which Britain reorganized its relationship to the colonies following the Seven Years War see: S. 
Max Edelson, The New Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined America Before Independence, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2017). Edelson uses extant maps from the British Board of Trade to illustrate how Britain sought 
to reorient colonial organization to be more amenable to British needs and interests.  
20 See for example: Daniel Dulany, “Considerations on the Propriety of Raising Taxes in the British 
Colonies,” in Jensen, Merrill, ed., Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763-1776, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 
2003), 94-107. Dulany’s work was widely republished and discussed, even in England, where it was cited by 
William Pitt in debate over repeal of the Stamp Act.   
21 This is not to say that this process was inevitable. There were numerous occasions when it is conceivable 
that the colonies and Britain could have been reconciled. Because no such reconciliation occurred, however, such 
speculation must remain hypothetical.  
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Wilson’s first major contribution to those discussions came in the form of a pamphlet: 
“Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Great 
Britain.” Although published in 1774, the bulk of it was written six years earlier in 1768. The 
pamphlet was well received when published, but by that point the arguments it made were 
already generally agreed upon by many in the colonies. Had it been published at the time it was 
written, it would have been much more explosive and could have marked Wilson as one of the 
furthest-thinking advocates for America active at the time. Because of this potential, and because 
he was still in a precarious societal position working to establish himself as a lawyer, Wilson 
followed the advice of those he asked to read the piece and decided against immediately 
publishing it.22 Even so, its emergence in 1774 brought Wilson renown as a rhetorician and built 
his status within patriot circles.  
As the title suggests, Wilson set out to understand whether Parliament had any claim of 
authority within the colonies and if it did, to mark the extent of that authority. He began by 
laying out an overarching organizing principle: government power must support the ultimate 
ends of government action. If power “would, in any instance, destroy instead of promoting, that 
end, it ought, in that instance, to be rejected.”23 This simple maxim provided the motivation for 
his theory of revolution: “all lawful government is founded on the consent of those who are 
subject to it,” and people are free to withdraw their consent when government is not fulfilling its 
purpose.24 Although this logic could theoretically support a fairly unlimited theory of revolution, 
                                                
22 William White, “Letter to James Wilson,” November 27, 1768, Gratz Collection, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania.   
23 James Wilson, “Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the Parliament 
of Great Britain,” in Collected Works of James Wilson, Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Liberty Fund, 2007), 4.  
24 James Wilson, “Considerations,” in Collected Works, 4.   
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Wilson bounded it by carefully expounding on the ends of government. “Such consent to form 
government,” he noted, “was given with a view to ensure and increase the happiness of the 
governed.” Wilson generalized even further: “the happiness of the society is the first law of 
every government.”25 From the beginning, therefore, Wilson established happiness as the 
ultimate arbiter for revolutionary action in his thought.  
According to Wilson, happiness represented the values at the core of good government. 
The rule of happiness is “founded on the law of nature” and “it must control every political 
maxim: it must regulate the legislature itself.” Where defenders of parliament pointed to the 
principles of parliamentary sovereignty at the heart of the British constitution as the fount of 
political power, Wilson, drawing on his previous training, reached for a higher power enshrined 
within natural law and moral philosophy. All political power, he declared, must be “attended 
with a right of insisting upon [government] making good use of their authority…with a moral 
security that this right will have its effect.”26 The presence of this moral security, of happiness, as 
promised in natural law creates civil liberty. Without it, a population is reduced to slavery.27 
Wilson evaluated the legitimacy of the British government in the colonies by asking a 
simple question: does “it ensure and increase the happiness of the American colonies, that the 
parliament of Great Britain should possess a supreme irresistible, uncontrolled authority over 
them?”28 Within his theory of revolution, happiness was the yardstick by which the events of the 
                                                
25 James Wilson, “Considerations,” in Collected Works, 5. 
26 James Wilson, “Considerations,” in Collected Works, 5. 
27 Like most others at the time, Wilson referred to slavery as a political state wherein one is dependent on 
the will of another. Like most others, he made reference to the potential enslavement of the colonies with little to no 
acknowledgement of the enslaved individuals living and working in the colonies. Wilson’s engagement with the 
issue was complex –– he enslaved one individual (who he freed in 1794) while also speaking out against slavery in a 
limited fashion. His full views on slavery will be discussed in Chapter Three.  
28 James Wilson, “Considerations,” in Collected Works of James Wilson, 5. 
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Imperial Crisis were judged Although Wilson certainly expressed belief in the grand conspiracy 
against American liberties cited by Bailyn and others, the placement of happiness within his 
system makes it clear that maximizing happiness was Wilson’s ultimate aspirational goal. The 
subjugation of American liberty was important to him because it influenced Americans’ pursuit 
of happiness. Given that evaluative function of happiness, it is important to push forward and 
understand the specific judgments Wilson made about British actions. These judgments ground 
our understanding of how he conceptualized happiness in the context of the events he lived 
through and also better inform our comprehension of what the Revolution meant to him.  
Wilson engaged in theoretical discussion under the assumption that “colonists are entitled 
to all the privileges of Britons,” for colonists “have committed no crimes to forfeit them.”29 The 
first privilege he noted is the right to participate in elections and thus consent to government. 
Such consent is an essential element of free government “justly deemed the strongest bulwark of 
the British liberties.”30 Without the power of consent, a dependency is created, for if colonists 
“are not capable of exercising [their] will,” then they must fundamentally depend on the will of 
another akin to a state of slavery. Wilson went on to detail the ways in which elections, the 
renewal of parliaments, and freedom to consent to government are enshrined as the “first 
principles…of perpetuating the liberties of a state.”31 Such a conclusion draws from his basic 
definition of natural law: “that all power is derived from the people –– that their happiness is the 
end of government.”32  
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Wilson then connected the theoretical to the tangible: “are the representatives of the 
commons of Great Britain the representatives of the Americans? Are they elected by the 
Americans? … [Do they] pursue the interest of the Americans?”33  On a basic level, he assumed, 
the answer must be no. The electoral power of the British commons did not extend to American 
colonies and as such, “those who embark freemen in Great Britain disembark slaves in 
America.”34 Such a situation placed “those rights ‘which every man is entitled to enjoy,’” 
(meaning the natural rights of mankind), on tenuous ground in America.35 The lack of “that 
check which interest puts upon the members of parliament” then made it likely that “it may 
become popular and reputable at home to oppress us.”36 Without a proper voice in government, 
Wilson reasoned, rights were not secure, and without secure rights, there could be no true liberty. 
Without liberty, the ends of government, the promotion of happiness, could not be fulfilled.  
This discussion led Wilson to his conclusion regarding the status of British authority in 
the colonies. As he notes, “parliamentary authority is derived solely from representation.”37 The 
active consent of the people is the only true foundation of governmental authority and political 
obligation. Thus, “if a person is bound only because he is represented it must certainly follow 
that wherever he is not represented he is not bound.”38 This formed the heart of colonial 
complaints against Britain. Because they could not express their interests in any official capacity, 
they had no safeguard with which to protect their rights. As a result, they could not claim liberty 
or happiness. This state contradicted Wilson’s first maxim of government and led him to 
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conclude that, in order to protect their happiness, the people were justified in seeking a new form 
of government through revolution.  
Even as he denied that parliament holds any authority in the colonies, which when 
written in 1768 was a radical claim, Wilson did not advocate for a complete separation from 
Britain.39 “A denial of the legislative authority,” he maintained, “is by no means inconsistent 
with that connection which ought to subsist between the mother country and her colonies.”40 He 
endeavored to show throughout that the colonists maintain the “warmest sentiments of loyalty to 
their sovereign.”41 Wilson drew a meaningful distinction between allegiance to George III and 
allegiance to parliament. In part, this distinction stemmed from his notions of consent and 
political autonomy which makes the pursuit of happiness possible. Colonial connections to the 
monarchy derived from historical precedent; as a result of the constitutional reform of the 17th 
century, Wilson argued that a properly structured relationship between King and colonies should 
not have threatened their fundamental rights. Their relationship with parliament, however, was 
fundamentally different and created “a dependence…slavish and unaccountable, or accounted for 
only by principles that are false and inapplicable” precisely because a parliament unaccountable 
to colonial control had the power to degrade colonists’ fundamental rights.42 A revolution against 
this power was, according to Wilson, fully warranted by the principles of good government and 
                                                
39 For an example of the radicalness of this claim, consider that Dickinson’s celebrated Letters from a 
Farmer in Pennsylvania, written around the same time as Wilson’s first draft in 1768 only denied Parliament’s 
taxing power. It was not until 1774, the same year that Wilson published, that celebrated writers like Jefferson (in A 
Summary View) adopted the idea that Parliament had no authority at all in the colonies.  
40 James Wilson, “Considerations,” in Collected Works, 25. 
41 James Wilson, “Considerations,” in Collected Works, 24. 
42 James Wilson, “Considerations,” in Collected Works, 28. 
 48 
natural law. In drawing that distinction, Wilson maintained a theory of revolution “founded upon 
the principles of reason, of liberty, and of law.”43 
The base assumptions and structure of Wilson’s argument in this pamphlet illustrate how 
philosophical notions of happiness intersect with revolutionary theory. Happiness in the 
revolutionary context begins with political autonomy. At this level, happiness intertwines with 
liberty and the two are mutually supportive. In order to support happiness, government must 
support citizens’ rights and citizens must have a say in how they are governed. When these 
conditions are not met, political revolution is justified and government must be reformed to 
better support its ultimate purpose.  
 The response to this pamphlet increased Wilson’s reputation both as a theorist and as a 
political actor and he soon became a leading figure in Pennsylvania’s revolutionary movement. 
A short time later, in January 1775 at a convention held in Philadelphia, Wilson was chosen to 
give an oration on the colonial cause to the delegates, which reflects his increased standing. This 
speech gave Wilson the opportunity to expand on the theory of revolution he had begun to 
develop in his first pamphlet. Within this address he was far more concrete than in his pamphlet, 
offering a running narrative of the various events that had defined imperial-colonial relations 
since 1763. Wilson was also far more indignant in this speech than he was in his pamphlet which 
parallels the marked decline in the possibility of reconciliation after 1774.44 Even so, he 
maintained that the actions of the colonists consisted of “virtuous opposition” which betrayed 
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neither “want of loyalty to our sovereign,” nor “want of affection to our brethren in Britain.”45 
Despite the earnest nature of colonial resistance, Wilson noted, the colonies still faced a “scheme 
depriving us of our property without our consent” which justified the extralegal measures taken 
to safeguard their “freedom and [their] safety.”46 
Whereas “Considerations” engaged with government at a theoretical level, using its 
supreme purpose as a way to structure a conversation on natural rights, his speech at the 
convention grounded conversation squarely within the realm of the political economy.47 By 
discussing the efforts of the British “ministry...to enslave and to ruin us,” Wilson debated the 
place of the colonies in the British empire.48 Throughout his speech he raised concerns about 
issues ranging from the protection of property, to trade regulation, to the duty of higher political 
powers to only exercise those powers for their subjects’ benefit. Concerns like these have led 
scholars to argue that inherent in colonial protest rhetoric was a positive articulation of 
government power through empire and not solely a negative reaction against government 
power.49 What mattered most to colonists was the government met their interests; had colonists 
judged that British power was acting to promote their interests following the Seven Years’ War, 
a strong critique of that power may have never materialized. In political economic terms, 
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historians argue that colonial protestors heavily criticized the authoritarian reform of the British 
Empire and instead advocated for a “radical Whig” notion of political economy centered on the 
public good and the development of consumer interests.50 Wilson’s revolutionary critiques, 
grounded in the promotion of happiness exemplify this approach to economic reform. Although 
this focus on material interest seems at odds with other intellectual approaches to the Revolution, 
Wilson’s foregrounding of happiness provides an avenue through which the two strands of 
revolutionary motivation can be unified.   
 Focusing on this material side of happiness also points to the ways in which the 
beginnings of the Revolution and the revolutionary theory developed at that time are tied to its 
tangible outcomes. Even before the colonies fully separated from Britain, forward-thinking 
patriots envisioned a new future for society organized around new principles of human life. 
James Wilson clearly had this future in mind as he spoke, prefacing the rhetorical climax of his 
address with the disclaimer that “the fate of us, the fate of millions now alive, the fate of millions 
yet unborn,” would be determined by the actions of the revolutionaries.51 Eventually that vision 
would manifest itself in Wilson’s constitutional vision which sought to enshrine philosophical 
happiness both as a means for individual moral improvement and for individual material 
prosperity within the very fabric of government. The fact that the structure of government as it 
existed for colonists in the 1770s could not deliver those ends is what ultimately alienated men 
like Wilson from the status quo and drove them towards revolutionary activity.  
Following the Pennsylvania Convention, Wilson continued to gain fame as a politician, 
orator, and advocate for America. In May 1775, Wilson joined the Pennsylvania delegation to 
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the Second Continental Congress. Wilson soon distinguished himself as a delegate and was 
appointed to a series of key committees, first to answer a call from Massachusetts for greater 
national support, then to deal with problems related to currency supply, and then to handle Indian 
affairs.52 This committee work was generally well-received, and gained Wilson esteem in the 
chamber. In January of 1776, however, Wilson angered radical delegates when he made a motion 
for Congress to disavow the King’s claim that the revolutionary movement sought total 
independence. To do so, Wilson called for a committee to draft a statement to Congress’s 
“Constituents and the World” to make their intentions clear. When the plan was approved, 
Wilson was appointed to the committee and tasked with drafting the statement.53  
Wilson’s prior published pieces on the crisis were either in line with or ahead of public 
opinion. “An Address to the Inhabitants of the Colonies” however was a conservative document 
designed to build sentiment for independence without fully advocating for separation. Within it, 
Wilson offered a rearguard defense of colonial action. He asked those judging the Congress’s 
actions to consider a simple question:  
When the forms of our Government are, by those entrusted with the Direction of them, 
perverted from their original Design; ought we to submit to this Perversion? Ought we to 
sacrifice the Forms, when the Sacrifice becomes necessary for preserving the Spirit of 
our Constitution? Or ought we to neglect and neglecting, to lose the Spirit by a 
superstitious Veneration for the Forms?54  
 
Wilson, of course, answered in the negative. “We regard those Forms,” he wrote, “and wish to 
preserve them as long as we can consistently with higher objects.”55 The higher objects Wilson 
cited here refer to the operations of natural law. Such principles extend beyond the reach of 
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statute legislation and the authority of the British Constitution. When coupled “with the sacred 
Authority of the people, from WHOM all LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY flows,” the principles of 
natural law gave Congress the right to “have exercised legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers.” This was done “for [the] Safety and Happiness [of the colonists.]” rather than “for the 
Purpose of establishing an independent Empire.”56 The purpose was always “the Defence and the 
Re-establishment of the constitutional rights of the Colonies” and, implicitly, the restoration of 
their happiness.57 
This argument, coupled with the development of individual liberty and property rights in 
his previous works, represents the progression of the moral revolution in the mind of James 
Wilson. Fidelity to moral principle and natural law drove his convictions. Such principles were 
antecedent to politics yet entered political discussion as the criterion by which government’s 
ends should be determined and evaluated. At each turn, he cited philosophical notions of 
happiness as the key reason for the divide between Great Britain and her colonies. While he was 
fully cognizant of the material “Advantages which have resulted to the Colonies…from the 
Connexion which has hithero subsisted,” he downplayed the role in which material concerns 
played into colonial-imperial relations. Instead, mutual benefit should be seen as deriving from a 
broader array of concerns including: “Religion, Laws, Manners, Customs and Habits.” These 
principles were threatened by the “Arbitrary Exertions of Power on the Part of Britain.” which 
meant by extension that “the Freedom, Happiness, and Glory,” of all citizens of the British 
Empire were threatened. 58 Wilson argued that this problem could be solved by restoring “to both 
countries those important Benefits that Nature seems to have intended them.” Doing so would 
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“secure the Continuance and the Encrease of those Benefits to numerous succeeding 
Generations.”59 In short, Wilson believed the Revolution to be for nothing short of the moral and 
physical prosperity, or happiness, of the colonists. The intellectual world of the eighteenth 
century was uniquely moral, and so it is fitting that Wilson cast the Revolution in moral terms.  
Before Wilson’s “Address” could be published, the context of events made it irrelevant. 
When Wilson had introduced his motion in December of 1775, it could have reasonably been 
argued that public sentiment was undecided regarding the question of independence. As Wilson 
wrote his address however, sentiment dramatically changed. First, the continued evolution of 
events out of doors, especially regarding the armed conflict in Boston, effected a de facto 
separation between Britain and the colonies. Second, and most importantly, in January of 1776, 
Thomas Paine published the pamphlet Common Sense. Compared to the lawyerly precision and 
restrained opulence of Wilson’s prose, Common Sense struck like a lightning bolt, energizing the 
cause for independence and severing “the last psychological and constitutional connection” 
between England and America.60 In place of Wilson’s carefully constructed attempts to salvage 
“the venerable Model of British Liberty” through reasoned reform, Paine offered Americans the 
“power to begin the world over again.”61 This is not to say that Wilson was not fully devoted to 
the American cause –– he carefully maintained that Congress’s “first [desire] is that America 
may be Free” –– but Paine’s polemics resonated in a way Wilson’s argument did not, and he 
advanced arguments that Wilson, writing in an official capacity, could not.62 Wilson’s “Address” 
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was entered into the journal of proceedings and then ‘“Ordered to lie on the table.”’63 Despite the 
fact that it was never published, the “Address” still represents the culmination of Wilson’s pre-
Independence theoretical work and conveys the way in which, working within the confines of the 
actions of the British government and patriots outside of doors, he constructed a theory of 
revolution devoted to the principles of natural law and the moral condition of happiness.  
In the spring of 1776, attention within Congress turned towards independence. Though 
more radically minded delegates like the Adamses of Massachusetts had been advocating for 
independence for some time, Congress consistently avoided the issue to placate moderate and 
conservative-minded delegates. Public opinion shifting vocally towards independence coupled 
with the impending invasion of New York by a large British fleet made this strategy impossible. 
Pennsylvania’s delegation was split on independence. At least initially, Wilson followed the lead 
of his former law tutor John Dickinson, and voted against independence. In the final vote, 
however, Wilson switched his vote in order to deliver Pennsylvania for the side of independence. 
Historians have often pointed towards this seeming ambivalence towards independence along 
with his standing as one of the most influential Federalists during the drafting and ratification of 
the Constitution to argue that there is an inherently conservative and anti-democratic streak 
within Wilson’s political philosophy. However, this does not conform to a close reading of his 
theoretical work. Instead, coupling his political action on the question of independence with the 
theory of revolution detailed in his pre-Independence public works further elucidates the 
mechanisms of that theory as well as the set of values at its heart.  
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Understanding the context of the vote for independence is crucial.64 Throughout 1775 and 
1776, the political situation in Pennsylvania shifted dramatically as the old provincial order 
slowly collapsed. During that time, a series of ad-hoc committees began to supplant the colony’s 
Assembly as the main source of political power. Even as this occurred, the elected assembly was 
still responsible for selecting and directing the delegates to Congress. The instructions they gave 
“enjoined” the delegates to “utterly reject any propositions…that may cause or lead to a 
separation from our Mother Country, or a change in the form of this Government.”65 Because the 
Assembly was a generally conservative body it was highly unlikely that those instructions would 
be changed in the absence of a wholesale overhaul of Pennsylvania’s political structure.  
Regardless of his personal feelings towards independence, Wilson was generally 
skeptical of radical efforts to completely overturn the political balance in the colony. Within 
Congress he took steps to both delay the vote on independence and delay issuing instructions to 
the colonies to replace their old colonial governments with new republican forms.66 It is likely 
that Wilson hoped that impending elections, coupled with an expansion of seats in the more 
radical Western portions of the colony would deliver a pro-independence majority in the 
Assembly and solve the problem through regular order. This did not occur and under radical 
pressure, business in the assembly ground to a halt. One of the few acts they were able to pass 
during this time did amend the instructions to the delegates in Congress, giving them open-ended 
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instructions to “promot[e] the liberty, safety, and interests of America.”67 After an extra-legal 
convention replaced the provincial government with a new Assembly elected by a much wider 
segment of the population, those instructions were further amended to allow the delegates to vote 
to support independence.68 Thus freed, Wilson became a swing vote for independence in the 
Pennsylvania Delegation. When the final vote was taken on July 2nd, Wilson’s vote delivered the 
state in favor of independence. 
His conduct throughout this process tells us several things. First, labeling Wilson as a 
cautious political actor is entirely appropriate. He hesitated when presented with radical crowd-
generated solutions to political problems and instead favored moderate solutions that preserved 
as much regular order as possible.69 It is irresponsible, however, to read that predilection as 
blanket conservatism.  Instead, the theoretical framework of revolution Wilson developed 
throughout his treatises and speeches provides a more grounded explanation for his conduct.  
His theory of revolution hinges on two related suppositions: first, that the formation, 
continuation, and abolition of government must only stem from the consent of those governed, 
and second, that government’s end must be the happiness and prosperity of its citizens or 
subjects. When government does not meet that end, citizens have a right to withdraw consent 
from the government and formulate a new one which better serves their happiness.70 This belief 
helps to explain Wilson’s hesitancy to support efforts to replace the elected assembly. While he 
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readily criticized Britain’s government for suppressing colonist’s rights, and proclaimed that a 
failure to reform would engender a separation from that government, he likely felt differently 
about Pennsylvania’s assembly.71 During the colonial period, Pennsylvania was regarded to be 
one of “the freest, most ethnically diverse, religiously open societies” earning it the moniker “the 
best poor man’s country” in the world. 72 It is generally felt that Pennsylvania’s government 
acted in the interest of its citizens during much of the Imperial Crisis until colonial-imperial 
relations truly broke down in the mid 1770s.73 Wilson therefore questioned whether it was 
necessary to completely overthrow this government. Was it threatening the happiness of its 
citizens? Perhaps, but not to the degree that the system could not be reformed. For much of the 
conflict, Wilson looked to reform rather than complete overthrow of the established order of 
power in order to make government more representative 
 Second, the emphasis on consent in Wilson’s revolutionary theory explains a deeper 
problem he had during discussions over independence. The most recent instructions offered to 
Wilson by the elected representatives who sent him to Philadelphia as a delegate ordered him to 
oppose separation from Britain. Although sentiment out-of-doors had clearly evolved, for an 
institutionally-minded and formally rigid thinker like Wilson, the instructions remained the 
clearest and only valid way to interpret popular sentiment because it was the only way public 
opinion could be translated through institutional means into a mandate. Without a change in 
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those instructions, Wilson likely felt bound to oppose the question. Wilson’s colleagues shared 
this view in the “Defense of Wilson” memorial, writing that:  
Mr. Wilson...believed a majority of the people of Pennsylvania were in favor of 
independence, but that the sense of the Assembly (the only representative body then 
existing in the Province) as delivered to him by their instructions, was against the 
proposition, that he wished the question to be postponed, because he had reason to 
believe the people of Pennsylvania would soon have an opportunity to express their 
sentiments upon this point, and he thought the people ought to have an opportunity given 
them to signify their opinion in a regular way upon a matter of such importance.74  
That he shifted his support for independence as the instructions changed corroborates the idea 
that he personally supported independence but was waiting for the people to voice similar 
approval through official mechanisms. Independence was a weighty question, and even after the 
change in instructions, had he personally opposed independence, he could have recused himself 
for the vote. This was done by both his former mentor John Dickinson and his friend and future 
business partner Robert Morris.75 That Wilson did not follow their lead and instead offered his 
positive support for independence suggests that by the spring and summer of 1776 he personally 
supported independence and awaited positive confirmation that the people did too before acting. 
Rather than illustrating conservative anti-democratical thought, it illustrates his theory of 
revolution, predicated on a government of happiness via consent, translated into practice.  
Surveying the whole of his intellectual and political work prior to July of 1776, what can 
we say of Wilson’s approach to revolution? First, his formal training in the context of the 
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Scottish Enlightenment clearly grounded his approach. While he certainly engaged with the 
series of events unfolding in America and the wider Atlantic world during the late 1760s and 
1770s, he did so within the context of a formalized framework of thought. That framework 
structured his theories and motivated his political actions. Wilson evaluated government through 
this framework, utilizing happiness as a metric. According to Wilson, happiness, which 
encompassed an individual’s moral and material wellbeing, was government’s great end. In order 
to secure happiness, the people, as the source of political power, must actively consent to a 
government which represents their interests. When government did not represent their interests 
and threatened their happiness, people had a right to revolution via withdrawing consent and 
instituting new forms of government to better meet their needs. In total, these principles put 
human life in accordance with the precepts of natural law in order to support human flourishing.   
Foregrounding the idea of happiness in the political thought of James Wilson offers a 
new avenue for understanding the Revolution. It shifts our attention away from the constraint of 
power and the deification of individual freedoms and instead demands that government ought to 
play a positive role in ensuring individual well-being of citizens. The common belief of the 
period is often summarized using a quote from Thomas Paine’s Common Sense: “Society is 
produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness 
POSITIVELY by uniting our affections, the latter NEGATIVELY by restraining our vices.”76 
Wilson offers a different wisdom. He believed that government should promote societal 
happiness as well as protect societal interests. “Without government,” Wilson wrote in the law 
lectures he delivered in the 1790s, “society in the present state of things, cannot flourish; far less 
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can it reach perfection.”77 That belief was clearly reflected in his theory of revolution. Once 
independence was declared, however, attention turned to translating these philosophical ideals 
into reality in order to support a republic of happiness. As the Revolution continued, Wilson 
sought to enshrine his vision of happiness as exemplified in his theory of revolution into a 
tangible system of government. In doing so, he built on the logic that led him to revolution in the 
first place: that government ought to be designed to promote individual happiness and foster 
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Chapter Three: 
Happiness’ Constitution  
 
James Wilson’s most lasting contribution to American political thought was to 
constitutional theory. Throughout the late 1770s, 1780s, and 1790s, Wilson devoted himself to 
solidifying the laws and institutions of the nascent United States through constitutional design 
and interpretation. First as a citizen of Pennsylvania, and then as a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention and Federalist leader during Ratification, he became an authority on constitutional 
theory and made invaluable contributions to the development of a unique American 
constitutional vision. He was heavily involved in the drafting of three constitutions: 
Pennsylvania’s first state constitution in 1776, the Federal Constitution in 1787 and the second 
Pennsylvania state constitution in 1790. This chapter compares the first Pennsylvania state 
constitution with the federal constitution in order to craft an understanding of Wilson’s approach 
to constitutional design.1  
Wilson’s thought is often cited as an example of high Federalism because of his embrace 
of a strong centralized national government. Categorizing Wilson as a Federalist is accurate; he 
valued preserving the federal union and he was a consistent advocate for government power. In 
this sense, Wilson’s thought is consistent with scholars who argue that at the Convention, 
Federalists attempted to craft the United States into a modern fiscal-military state.2 However, 
while Wilson certainly favored institutions like a central bank cited by these scholars, by 
utilizing happiness to frame his constitutional thought, we can better understand not only the 
specific constitutional provisions Wilson advocated for, but also of the reasoning behind his 
                                                
1 The second state constitution is generally regarded to be an extension of the principles of the Federal 
Constitution and so does not provide as vivid a contrast as the first two constitutions Wilson engaged with.  
2 Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making 
of the American State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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advocacy and the promise he saw for the new nation. Wilson favored a strong government 
because he believed government ought to play an important role in supporting individual 
advancement on both material and moral levels. Without “energy” in government, he noted at the 
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, “the advantages of society [would be] lost.”3 He 
supported constitutional provisions like “the necessary and proper clause” which would give 
government the necessary latitude to act in favor of its citizens so that government could fulfill 
its role as a support for happiness.4 He advocated for provisions like the direct election of 
senators and the president because he believed that direct participation in republican government 
would craft citizen’s moral sensibilities and virtues.5 His overarching devotion to happiness 
therefore provides the conceptual key to understanding the whole of his constitutional vision.  
Wilson’s first engagement with constitutional theory occurred at the state level in 
Pennsylvania. Although generally used to paint Wilson as anti-democratic, Wilson’s objections 
to the 1776 constitution demonstrate the ways in which his basic approach to government drove 
his constitutional vision. He would eventually apply the theories he developed in 1776 at the 
Federal Convention in 1787. As such, to understand his work on the federal constitution, it is 
                                                
3 James Wilson, “Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of 
the United States, 1787,” in Collected Works of James Wilson, Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, ed. 
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2007), 252. 
4 This provision grew directly out of his revolutionary critiques of imperial policy –– by giving Congress 
wide latitude to act, he hoped to empower the new national government to directly support citizen’s in a way that the 
British empire failed to in the 1760s and 1770s.  
5 James R. Zink and Michelle Schwarze note the importance of moral philosophy to understanding 
Wilson’s view of institutions in their article on his constitutional thought. They argue that Wilson’s thought 
represents a synthesis of Madisonian and Jeffersonian notions of republicanism through the combination of 
Jefferson’s belief that institutions reflect and shape people’s principles with Madison’s structure of institutional 
checks and balances. Where their analysis falls short is in its failure to fully consider Wilson’s thought as its own 
unique strand and their contention that Wilson fully adopted Madison’s belief that the primary purpose of 
government was to regulate people’s negative tendencies. By utilizing happiness as a metric to ground Wilson’s 
political thought we can see both how Wilson developed innovative constitutional theories and how he developed a 
specific positive role for government within those theories. See: James R. Zink, and Michelle Schwarze, “James 
Wilson’s Science of Politics and the Moral Psychology of American Constitutionalism.” American Political 
Thought 7, no. 4 (2018): 588-613. 
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critical to first understand his critique of the 1776 Pennsylvania constitution. Written soon after 
independence was declared, it embraced the democratic egalitarianism of Thomas Paine’s 
Common Sense.6 Under the new constitution, Pennsylvania’s government consisted of a single 
unicameral legislature, a pluralistic executive council elected by that legislature, and a judiciary 
appointed for a fixed term. The constitution removed property requirements for voting and gave 
the franchise to all taxable male inhabitants over the age of 21, provided that they signed a 
loyalty oath to the new government. Finally, the Constitution provided for its own amendment 
via a “council of censors” which would meet every seven years to assess and update the 
provisions of the constitution.7 Pennsylvania’s new constitution translated the furthest reaching 
elements of revolutionary rhetoric into reality, making good on revolutionary appeals to man’s 
inherent equality as well as the virtue of simplistic government in what one scholar has labeled, 
“a radical experiment in politics.”8  
 Wilson soon became one of the active leaders of a group of prominent citizens who 
vehemently opposed the new constitution. Branding themselves first as “anti-constitutionalists” 
and then as “the Republican Society,” members tended to be wealthy and well-connected, but it 
should be noted that there were exceptions to this rule and the Republican Society’s membership 
did represent something of a cross-section of Philadelphia’s middling and upper strata.9 Critics of 
                                                
6 Although Paine’s plan contains only the most basic sketch of a government, it was influential in 
Constitutional thought. It included such features as annually elected state assemblies and a Continental Congress 
with a presiding officer chosen by lot requiring 3/5 of states to agree in order to pass legislation. Thomas Paine, 
“Common Sense,” in Merrill Jensen, ed., Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), 432-433.  
7 Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, from The Avalon Project. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp. 
8 Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1969), 226.  
9 For an analysis of membership in the Republican and Constitutional Societies, see: A. Kristen Foster, 
Moral Visions and Material Ambitions, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 116-121.; and Steven Rosswurm, Arms, 
 64 
this organized opposition often deride their work as anti-democratic conservatism.10 Because of 
the preponderance of merchants amongst the members, it is often assumed that they acted out of 
pure economic interest or that their desire was to install themselves as a new American 
aristocracy. Treating his opposition as an expression of blanket conservatism or naked self-
interest does a disservice to Wilson’s more nuanced thought. Attention to his arguments 
elucidates his concerns regarding the document: they stemmed from his conception of 
government and his own hope for the promise of republicanism in America.  
On March 24, 1779, the Pennsylvania Gazette featured a proclamation “To the Citizens 
of Pennsylvania” which detailed Wilson’s thinking.11 The missive outlined the philosophical 
lines along which Wilson judged the document. Unsurprisingly, Wilson stated that the supreme 
purpose of the Republican society was to support “the liberty and happiness of Pennsylvania.”12 
The basic argument he made against the constitution stems from this desire: rather than 
protecting the freedoms gained from separating from English tyranny, the new constitution’s 
“general tendency and operation will be to join the qualities of the different extremes of bad 
government” and “introduce the same monster, so destructive of humanity, among ourselves.”13 
Moving point by point through the Constitution, Wilson contended that its strictures 
would cede Revolutionary gains. He first took issue with the idea of a unicameral legislature. 
                                                
Country, and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and “Lower Sort” During the American Revolution, 1775-1783, (New 
Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press 1987), 176-177. 
10 This is true of Wilson’s contemporaries and modern historians. See for example: Robert L. Brunhouse, 
The Counter-revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790. (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942).; and 
Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: ‘the People’, the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American 
Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
11 Although signed jointly, authorship of this document was attributed to Wilson by Charles Page Smith 
based on its style as well as a contemporary attribution from Timothy Matlack. Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, 
Founding Father, 1742-1798, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1956), 400. 
12 The Pennsylvania Gazette, “To the Citizens of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1779. 
13 The Pennsylvania Gazette, “To the Citizens of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1779. 
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Such a body, he wrote, possesses a “natural tendency towards despotism” because “there is no 
power that can confine it within its proper bounds” should the legislature act tyrannically.14 
Wilson’s solution, intuitively enough, was to install an upper chamber in the legislature as a 
stronger check to halt tyranny. Anticipating a common critique of that system, that supporters of 
an upper house were only interested in installing an American aristocracy, Wilson argued that a 
senate would not lead to aristocracy because elections would retain the people as “the fountain of 
all [political] authority.”15 The argument that rigorous application of popular sovereignty would 
ensure republican efficacy, once refined, would become the heart of Wilsonian constitutionalism. 
At the national convention in 1787, Wilson expanded this idea across the full system of 
government. In 1776, however, he used it simply to defend the contention that a more complex 
governmental structure could still foster republican values.  
Wilson also heavily criticized the loyalty oaths citizens were required to take in order to 
“exercise the first right of freemen –– choosing their legislators.”16 A mixture of freedom of 
conscience with popular sovereignty played a vital role in Wilson’s constitutional theory and in 
his overarching theory of government and happiness. Because of this, Wilson found loyalty oaths 
to be especially repugnant. Wilson’s critiques are underrepresented in critical appraisals of the 
1776 constitution. In a rush to confirm the document as a paragon of democracy, supporters 
(both past and present) elide the disenfranchisement of a diverse group of citizens including 
Tories, Quakers, and even men like Wilson, who while fully supportive of the American cause, 
did not believe in the new constitution and would not sign the loyalty oaths required to vote. As 
noted by Robert F. Williams, the 1776 constitution assumed a homogeneity of opinion within the 
                                                
14 The Pennsylvania Gazette, “To the Citizens of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1779. 
15 The Pennsylvania Gazette, “To the Citizens of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1779. 
16 The Pennsylvania Gazette, “To the Citizens of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1779. 
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population not reflected in reality.17 Instead, the constitution disenfranchised some citizens while 
giving those who remained the chance for self-aggrandizement. Taken together, Wilson’s 
critiques culminate in the argument that ultimately, “continuing the present constitution” would 
feed political actors with an “ambition to tyrannize over their fellow citizens” and could not be 
supported.18   
Although the arguments advanced in “To the Citizens” were mainly theoretical, practical 
evidence also convinced Wilson that the state constitution did not support the happiness of 
Pennsylvanians. As he noted in “To the Citizens,” “while the other States enjoy happiness and 
tranquility under the governments, Pennsylvania exhibits mournful scenes of weakness and 
distraction.”19 Pennsylvania’s post-independence position, beset by invasion, occupation, in-
fighting, and economic catastrophe, did little to convince men like Wilson that their government 
was effective and deserving of support. The problems faced by the state, and especially the city 
of Philadelphia were complex and wound together constitutional, economic, and factional strife, 
to demonstrate the necessity of a strong constitutional structure for stability. While it’s true that 
any government in power would have likely struggled to manage the crises, the weakly 
empowered state government provided for by the 1776 constitution was particularly ineffective, 
which convinced Wilson that the constitution was not meeting the needs of its citizens. 
Runaway inflation and an inability to control the prices of essential goods was one of the 
most severe issues Pennsylvania faced. Exacerbated by British invasion and occupation through 
                                                
17 Robert F. Williams. “The Influences of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution on American Constitutionalism 
during the Founding Decade” in PMHB, Vol. 112, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 25-48. 
18 The Pennsylvania Gazette. “To the Citizens of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1779. 
19 The Pennsylvania Gazette. “To the Citizens of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1779. 
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1777 and 1778, by 1779 the problem ballooned into a general catastrophe.20 To solve the 
problem, they enabled an ad-hoc committee to take charge of prices. That committee worked for 
most of the summer of 1779 while warning residents that the “rage for raising prices will, unless 
it be put a stop to, become the ruin both of those who contrived it, and those who follow it.”21 To 
solve the problem, however, they could do little more than issue notices and lean on the city’s 
merchant elite to lower prices themselves. Absent any real formal political power, they admitted 
defeat in September of 1779 and declared there to be “no eligible method but to endeavor to keep 
matters as they were, until the meeting of the Assembly, before whom we have laid the 
business.”22  
At the same time the committee offered ineffectual solutions, the situation in 
Philadelphia’s streets slowly deteriorated. In December of 1778, an anonymous letter published 
in the Pennsylvania Packet, titled “A Hint,” warned Philadelphia’s elite that “Hunger will break 
through stone walls, and the resentment excited by it may end in your destruction.”  By late May 
1779, the discord in the city made many citizens “apprehensive of a mob rising” and two days 
later residents were scared by the appearance of “threatening handbills.” 23  These broadsides, 
titled “For Our Country’s Good!” and signed “Come on Cooly,” highlighted the plight of the 
lower classes in Philadelphia and warned that “We have turned out against the enemy and we 
                                                
20 Pennsylvania’s economic problems were compounded by both the government’s inability to function 
properly, the general pressure placed on colonial currencies by separation from Britain, and by wartime invasion. 
From September of 1777 to June of 1778, Philadelphia and its surrounding environs were occupied by the British. 
For more, see: Paul Langston, ““A Fickle, and Confused Multitude”: War and Politics in Revolutionary 
Philadelphia, 1750-1783,” PhD diss., University of Colorado, 2013. 
21 Pennsylvania Packet, June 29, 1779.  
22Pennsylvania Packet, September 24, 1779.  
23 Elizabeth Drinker. May 22, 1779 and May 24, 1779 in The Diary of Elizabeth Drinker, ed. Crane, Elaine 
Forman, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991). 
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will not be eaten up by monopolizers and forestallers.”24 At the end of August, a second 
broadside, signed “Come on Warmly” to reflect the escalation of tempers, was posted. In 
charged language, it called for the punishment of “overbearing Merchants,” the “swarm of 
Monopolizers and Speculators,” and the “infernal gang of Tories,” keeping prices high and 
working against the Constitution.25 Continued crowd action threatened violence should their 
demands be unmet.  
On October 4th, 1779, the tensions that had been building for most of the year exploded 
during an event now referred to as the Fort Wilson Riot.26 That day, a large crowd gathered at a 
local tavern in order to drive several prominent Tories from the city. As their anger intensified, 
calls rang out to “get Wilson,” likely because of his merchant connections and defense of 
accused Tories at treason trials the previous Spring, and the crowd began to march towards 
Wilson’s house at the intersection of Third and Walnut Streets. Notified of the movements, 
Wilson and a group of other prominent citizens retreated inside the house. As the crowd 
demonstrated outside, a shot rang out and both sides began to trade volleys. The crowd attempted 
to force entry into the house until they were dispatched by Philadelphia’s City Light Cavalry, led 
by the President of Pennsylvania, Joseph Reed. When the smoke of the conflict cleared, one man 
                                                
24  “For Our Country’s good!” May 23, 1779, in Steven Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class, 178. 
25 “Gentlemen and Fellow Citizens,” August 29, 1779, in Steven Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class, 
205-206.  
26 For the best descriptions of the “riot” see: detailed primary source accounts including: “Journal of Allen 
McLane,” in The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants vol. 2, Henry 
Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds., (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958). and Horace Edwin Hayden, ed., 
“The Reminiscences of David Hayfield Conyngham, I750-1834.” in Wyoming Historical and Geological Society, 
Proceedings and Collections, vol. 8, 208-215. See also: John K. Alexander. “The Fort Wilson Incident of 1779: A 
Case Study of the Revolutionary Crowd,” William and Mary Quarterly, Volume 31 Number 4 (October 1974), 589-
612.; C. Page Smith, “The Attack on Fort Wilson,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 78, No. 
2 (April 1954), 177-188; A. Kristen Foster, Moral Visions and Material Ambitions, 121-124; and Steven Rosswurm, 
Arms, Country, and Class, Chapter 7, esp. 210-217.   
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inside the house and several outside were dead. Wilson fled the city and remained in hiding until 
the legislature and courts successfully resolved the conflict.27  
The Fort Wilson Riot vividly illustrated the importance of stability in republican 
governments as a prerequisite for the pursuit of happiness to Wilson. Whereas he had advocated 
revolution because the British government’s actions negatively restrained the ability to pursue 
happiness, in Pennsylvania, the problem was reversed. In Wilson’s opinion, Pennsylvania’s 
government, weakly structured and wracked by partisan in-fighting, could not positively 
influence individual happiness, or in the case of Fort Wilson, even maintain a modicum of order. 
More than self-interest or a desire to limit democratic participation, higher aspirations for 
government drove Wilson’s opposition to the state constitution. He utilized this experience to 
articulate a more rigorously designed constitutional framework to support happiness for the 
citizens of America. In 1787, he entered the federal convention as one of the most nationally-
minded delegates and stridently advocated for policies consistent with his vision of happiness.   
The Constitutional Convention, and the document it produced, are two of the most 
studied aspects of early American political history. Conventional literature heralds the 
convention as a uniquely “Madisonian Moment” and the Constitution is regarded as a uniquely 
Madisonian triumph.28 This results in part because James Madison did play an essential role in 
the proceedings, but more importantly it is a reflection of the fact that Madison monopolized 
procedural information through his highly detailed notes on the convention. 29 He also dominates 
                                                
27 In March 1780, the Assembly issued a general pardon for all involved in the riot. They also introduced a 
slate of bills designed to mollify the crowd that marched against the Fort.  
28 Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, (New York: 
Vintage 1996).  
29 Historians have recently argued that much of Madison’s historiographical influence stems from his 
control of information both during the convention through his notes and during ratification through The Federalist. 
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historiographical interpretation of the document through the pages of The Federalist. From this 
stilted view, it is surmised that the primary concerns of the Constitution are the diffusion of 
power to protect liberty and the balancing of interests and protection of rights within an enlarged 
commercial republic.30 Although these themes are certainly important, it is unfair to reduce the 
Constitution to only these purposes, and expanding our view of its creation to include figures like 
James Wilson reveals a far more diverse philosophical basis for consideration.   
The convention was Wilson's professional apex and he likely played a bigger role than 
any delegate besides Madison in determining the final product. In contrast to Madison’s more 
pessimistic focus on the balancing of interests, Wilsonian constitutionalism offers a more organic 
and positive approach to government.31 Whereas Madison privileged property and interests as 
fundamental political units, for Wilson, the individual human being remained the sole unit of 
politics.32 At the convention, Wilson’s devotion to popular sovereignty and a more actively 
empowered government led him to make prescient arguments which presaged the great 
constitutional questions and developments which have influenced American thought since the 
passage of the constitution.33 Each of these issues stem from his philosophical attachment to 
                                                
See: Mary Sarah Bilder, Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2015). 
30 This conception is developed extensively in numerous sources related to the Constitution but is most 
forcefully expressed in Rakove’s Original Meanings. For further developments of Madisonian thought see for 
example two recent works: Jeff Broadwater, Jefferson, Madison, and the Making of the Constitution, (Chapel Hill: 
UNC Press, 2019) for a discussion on how Madison, in concert with Jefferson developed a consistent approach to 
republican thought in response to the crises of the 1780s.; and Thomas Ricks, First Principles: What America’s 
Founders Learned from the Greeks and Romans and How That Shaped Our Country, (New York: Harper Collins, 
2020), 193-216 for an exploration of how Madison engaged with classical thought to solve long standing problems 
with republican thought. Ricks argues that virtue as a political force played little influence in the final outcome of 
the convention, a contention which is rebutted by Wilson’s thought.  
31 William Ewald, “James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution,” University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of Constitutional Law 10, no. 5 (2008), 916-925.  
32 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention of 1787,” in Collected Works, 115. See also: William 
Ewald, “James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution,” 978.   
33 William Ewald, “James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution.” Ewald’s analysis is replete with 
examples of Wilson’s prescience, including on the popular election of U.S. Senators, the usage of the “necessary and 
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happiness as the supreme moral concept which grounds the human experience and provides 
meaning to human life. This catalog of thought is largely lost if one focuses only on Madison’s 
influence. Following Wilson opens new avenues of interpretation for the Constitution and of 
understanding for the grand purpose of political action in the United States.  
The idea that the people were the ultimate source of political power grounded Wilson’s 
thought. Given his reputation in less-focused scholarly pieces as an anti-democratic conservative 
monopolizer, this dedication to democratic principle seems somewhat jarring but is consistent 
with his prior intellectual work and general approach to moral philosophy. The metaphor Wilson 
often used to capture his views was that of the pyramid. Like a pyramid, Wilson argued that the 
federal government needed “as broad a basis as possible” so as to raise it “to a considerable 
altitude.”34 Wilson remained committed to integrating the people into the structure of 
government, although as noted by William Ewald, the metaphor of the pyramid more accurately 
explains Madison’s belief in the filtration of power through bodies like the Senate rather than 
Wilson’s view of popular sovereignty.35 In later speeches, Wilson compared the passage of 
power from people to government as that of water flowing in a stream, which better illustrates 
the nuances of his thought.36 He also extended his belief in popular election to include both the 
Senate and the Executive and opposed any “unnecessary innovations” in restricting the franchise 
of electors.37 Supporting direct election for the President and the Senate put Wilson outside of 
                                                
proper” clause, and critiques of the electoral college and comparative strength of direct election. Whereas Wilson’s 
vision of a national citizenship seemed unrealizable in his own time, historical development has brought American 
identity more in line with Wilson’s vision than perhaps any other founder.  
34 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention” in Collected Works, 82-83.  
35 William Ewald, “James Wilson and the Drafting of the U.S. Constitution,” 942-944.  
36 See: James Wilson, “Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention,” in Collected Works, 193.  
37 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention,” in Collected Works, 85; and 139. Although Wilson 
did advocate for direct election of the President, he was also the architect of the electoral college which emerged as a 
key compromise measure later in the convention.  
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the mainstream at the convention considering both plans were rejected, however they aptly 
demonstrate his commitment to popular sovereignty and the integration of the people’s voice 
into government.  
This commitment is an extension and refinement of the core power he assigned to 
consent in his theory of revolution. Individual participation in government was the key to 
popular sovereignty, which Wilson saw as critical to the republican experiment. Allowing 
citizens a voice at all levels of government ensured that government itself “possessed the mind or 
sense of the people at large” and helped limit the possibility that the government would abuse its 
power.38 More importantly, individual participation held the key to individual improvement, 
which Wilson identified as a key purpose of republican government. Countering Madisonian 
notions, Wilson denied that “property was the sole object…of government and society” arguing 
instead that “the cultivation and improvement of the human mind was [that] most noble 
object.”39 As government, driven by the people’s voice, sought the common good, the people’s 
voice itself would be refined by participation in government. This relationship connected 
republican government and happiness –– as people took steps like education and engagement 
needed to be active citizens in a republic, they would refine their morals, habits, and tastes, 
ultimately leading them to more moral, prosperous, and thus happy lives. These building blocks, 
sovereignty and improvement, provided the basis of the pursuit of happiness.  
Wilson’s work at the convention drew on his already developed notions of how 
government could aid citizens, which led him to also consistently advocate for an active and 
powerful national government that would form the American people into “one nation of 
                                                
38 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention,” in Collected Works, 90.  
39 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention,” in Collected Works, 115.  
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brethren.”40 In contrast to more locally-minded delegates who believed a strong national 
government would be anathema to the needs and desires of American citizens, he argued that “A 
private citizen of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the Gen. or State 
legislatures provided it be exercised for his happiness.”41 Wilson recognized that ensuring that 
government power was directed toward the proper aim of providing for citizens’ happiness was 
as critical for good government as the institutional distribution of power.  
Wilson also translated his plan for an active and empowered national government into the 
design of individual departments. In debate over the executive, it was Wilson, not Madison, who 
led the convention and first argued for a single executive empowered with a limited set of 
prerogatives. This proposition generated controversy given that many delegates were concerned 
that a single executive would inevitably become a monarch. Wilson held firm, responding that a 
single executive would give the “most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office” while 
avoiding the pitfalls of Britain through careful choice of which prerogatives to grant the 
executive.42 Wilson also advocated for direct election of the president before compromising with 
a proposal for an electoral college. His preferred mode of selection likely made him more willing 
to trust an empowered executive than other delegates –– given that the people would choose the 
president, he had little fear that an executive could override the will of the people and grow 
tyrannical. By the end of the convention, Wilson’s essential vision remained intact and his mark 
is still evident on the office of the president. Where other delegates sought to dilute power 
behind layers of procedural constraints, Wilson sought to empower government officials like the 
president so that they had the latitude needed to act for the common good.  
                                                
40 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention,” in Collected Works, 92. 
41 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention,” in Collected Works, 99. 
42 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Federal Convention,” in Collected Works, 83-84.  
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By mid-July, the Convention had agreed to a series of propositions but had not yet agreed 
to any fully-fledged written framework. The job of crafting such a framework fell to the 
Committee of Detail, of which Wilson was a key member. Despite the importance of the 
Committee’s task, it has not received sufficient coverage in academic explorations of the 
Constitution.43 Although their instructions had been merely to compile the various motions and 
agreements the delegates had made into one document, the committee far exceeded that mandate 
and inserted new language, much of which made it into the final approved draft. 44 These 
provisions touched on the major issues dealt with in the convention, ranging from slavery to the 
scope and power of the federal government. In committee, Wilson worked to inject his own 
vision of government into each draft and thus through the Committee of Detail, he wielded 
unmatched influence over the final product of the Convention.  
One of those provisions which Wilson inserted is perhaps one of the most important lines 
of constitutional text to be included in the final document: the necessary and proper clause. 
Although Southern members on the Committee had sought to limit the power of Congress by 
strictly enumerating what it could or could not legislate on, Wilson’s added clause, stipulating 
that Congress had the power to “make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested…in the government of the 
                                                
43 For a full narrative of the debates and discussions of the Committee of Detail, see William Ewald, 
“James Wilson and the Drafting of the U.S. Constitution.”   
44 The earliest drafts produced by the Committee bear a strong southern influence and were likely produced 
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Drafting of the Constitution,” 989-992.  
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United States” dramatically expanded the scope of subjects Congress could legislate on.45 As far 
back as during the Imperial Crisis, Wilson expressed a belief that government ought to actively 
support the endeavors of citizens in order to foster their moral and material development. Later, 
in the 1780s, Wilson consistently advocated for institutions like a national bank, arguing that the 
economic impact provided by such institutions would ultimately be “highly advantageous” to the 
future growth of the United States.46 Given his experiences in Pennsylvania, it is not surprising 
that Wilson took steps to give the national government a flexible array of powers.47 In Wilson’s 
mind, activities like chartering a bank were essential to supporting the development of the 
country and its citizens. The “necessary and proper” clause represents one way in which he 
reversed constitutional wisdom that had previously plagued him by ensuring that government 
could react to diverse situations which might impact the happiness of its citizens.48 
 Other sections added to the final draft delivered by the Committee of Detail support this 
outlook as well. Critical among these are a set of specific restrictions of state power as well as 
the Supremacy clause. Perhaps as an answer to the restriction of powers placed on the national 
legislature, in Article XIII of his draft, Wilson prevented states from actions like conducting 
foreign diplomacy and taxing imports without the consultation of the national legislature.49 What 
                                                
45 James Wilson, “Reported by the Committee of Detail,” in Collected Works, 131.; See also: William 
Ewald, “James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution,” 990-992.  
46 James Wilson, “Considerations on the Bank of North America,” in Collected Works, 79.  
47 Wilson’s views reflect a wider intellectual debate over constitutionalism which defined American 
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Era. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). 
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49 James Wilson, “Reported by the Committee of Detail,” in Collected Works, 135.  
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would eventually become the “Supremacy Clause” asserted that acts of Congress made under the 
authority of the Constitution “shall be the supreme law of the several States…any thing in the 
Constitution or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.”50 In effect, this clause 
was designed to bypass a large collection of state laws and provisions which Wilson found 
incompatible with good government.51 If the federal government could be designed properly and 
if that government could then be elevated above previous constitutional forms, then the benefits 
of good government would spread to all corners of the country. The changes Wilson inserted 
through committee work did much to establish fluidity of power in the national government in 
order to give the government the ability to support happiness. Wilson’s additions demonstrate 
how his philosophical attachment to happiness shaped his constitutional visions and together 
they show what a government devoted to the support of happiness would look like.  
The most contentious issue facing the Committee was slavery.52 Slavery produced 
immense tension throughout the Convention and threatened to derail the proceedings at several 
points. Scholars have demonstrated the myriad ways in which the South was accommodated 
during the Convention and the myriad ways in which Constitutional provisions were used to 
support slavery following ratification.53 This work should not be discounted and provides an 
essential window through which to view the Convention and political life in revolutionary 
America. However, this work falls short in evaluating the intentions and mindsets of those 
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framers who were opposed to slavery as they drafted the document. Intense focus on the ways in 
which the Constitution was utilized to uphold slavery after its adoption obscures the original 
intent of the framers with regard to the issue by substituting the actions of later actors for their 
own.  
 Certain historians have defended the document’s anti-slavery credentials along these 
lines.54 They contend that by the virtue of not explicitly recognizing “property in man,” the 
Constitution was anti-slavery at heart and provided the platform for abolitionist activity in the 
Early Republic.55 While this argument overstates the true anti-slavery sentiment present at the 
Convention, it does better capture the notion that many delegates did believe that they had set 
slavery on the path to extinction and thus the Constitution should not necessarily be viewed as 
pro-slavery at its core. Instead, its pro-slavery reputation is more a product of the politics of the 
Early Republic than the best intentions and hopes of the framers. This is an especially salient 
lens under which to consider Wilson.  
No physical state could contradict Wilsonian visions of happiness more than that of 
chattel slavery. Throughout his career, however, Wilson left an ambiguous record on the issue. 
He advocated against slavery at various points but enslaved an individual, Thomas Purcell, for 
much of the Revolutionary period.56 Like many founders, Wilson underwent an evolution of 
thought over the course of his career and his anti-slavery views hardened. In debate over the 
Articles of Confederation, he spoke about it as harmful to society and told delegates “it was their 
duty to lay every discouragement on the importation of slavery” to the nascent United States.” 
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During this speech, however, he spoke almost exclusively about its effect on white citizens rather 
than recognizing enslaved individuals. 57 In his law lectures in the 1790s, however, he offered a 
stronger repudiation of slavery, declaring it “repugnant to the principles of natural law, that such 
a state should subsist in any social system.” Furthermore, he found justifications for slavery “to 
be built upon a false foundation” because the law “protects all.” 58 By the end of his career, he 
recognized the legal humanity of the enslaved. Wilson freed Thomas Purcell in 1794, which is 
consistent with the stronger stance he took on slavery later in his career and helped belatedly 
align his actions more closely with his rhetoric. 
 Wilson’s work at the Convention was similarly mixed. Throughout the proceedings, he 
spoke against the pro-slavery bloc and sought to limit the power granted to it. In a speech on the 
3/5 compromise, he argued if enslaved people were to be counted for representation as people 
then they must be “admitted on an equality with White Citizens” and if they were to be included 
as property then there was no sense in admitting enslaved individuals for the purposes of 
representation while not recognizing other forms of property as well.59 This position shows that 
at least rhetorically, Wilson was willing to extend citizen-sovereignty to Black individuals: 
should representation be granted on their behalf, they ought to have the full rights of citizens. 
Later in the Convention, he helped limit the enforcement of the fugitive slave clause, expressed 
disapproval of the slave trade, argued against providing special benefits to slave traders and 
importers and noted that “the abolition of Slavery seemed to be going on in the U.S. [and] that 
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the good sense of the several States would probably by degrees compleat it.”60 At least when 
expressing his own views, Wilson showed an unwillingness to accept the logic of enslavement 
and expressed a firm hope that slavery would soon be abolished.  
Despite his personal opinions, Wilson helped broker critical compromises which 
sustained slavery. He valued the completion of the Constitution more than abolition. As the 
convention reached a conclusion, he “urged [it to] dispatch its business” and “leav[e] the [3/5] 
clause as it stands.” To achieve federal union, Wilson was willing to cede ground to Southern 
delegates.61 The sad irony was that Wilson was likely willing to compromise because he 
assumed that slavery would be a temporary nuisance which Congress would abolish soon after 
being empowered to do so. He argued at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention that the 
document provided “the foundation for banishing slavery out of this country.”62 It was clear that 
Wilson both hoped for the end of slavery and believed that it was in sight. Because of this, he felt 
that empowering the national government was more critical than proactively ending slavery. 
That Wilson and the other founders were wrong on this count and therefore their carefully laid 
compromises helped sustain slavery for the next 80 years, was one of the great tragedies of the 
Founding. Ultimately, Wilson’s interaction with slavery at the Convention reminds that the 
experience of happiness remained racially limited during the Founding Era.  
Following the delivery of the Committee of Detail’s draft, the Convention’s activity was 
frantic. Delegates needed a quick conclusion to their work in order to maintain public 
confidence. This attitude helps explain the pinch Wilson expressed regarding compromise on 
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slavery –– that issue, along with a host of others, was dealt with in a flurry of action designed to 
conclude the deliberations as quickly as possible. Even so, by the end, there was much that 
Wilson could be proud of in the final product. The final design of the presidency reflected his 
vision for the executive branch and he also won key procedural victories regarding the 
composition of the legislative branch. More importantly, Wilson innovatively inserted his own 
key constitutional and political theory into the document. These insertions helped craft a 
government focused on the individual and individual happiness. It also ensured that government 
itself was sufficiently empowered to enact measures to promote that happiness. In doing so, 
Wilson adopted constitutional language which incorporated the philosophical training that 
grounded his worldview, the theory of revolution he developed in the 1760s and 1770s, and his 
experiences under the 1776 constitution into a cogent theory of government. By following 
Wilson and not Madison, one sees a republic founded not on the control of faction or balancing 
of interests but rather on the principles of happiness.  
Wilson’s constitutional vision continued to evolve following the signing of the 
Constitution on September 17, 1787.  It is important to study his actions during the ratification 
debates because although the text of the Constitution was fixed in the Convention, the 
interpretation of that text was not.63 Ratification provided a chance for men like Wilson to insert 
their own values into the meaning of the text. Moreover, the ratification process forced those in 
favor of adopting the Constitution to articulate and defend a coherent philosophical theory of 
government which is useful for determining Wilson’s constitutional outlook. Wilson emerged as 
one of the most influential leaders championing support for ratification and his speeches 
delivered during this time present one of the clearest articulations of “federalism” as an ideology 
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as well as of the wider meaning he ascribed to the Constitution.64 Through his work following 
the convention, we gain a better understanding of Wilson’s approach to the Constitution.  
Gordon Wood’s Creation of the American Republic offers the classic account of 
ideological Federalism.65 He argues that it was primarily concerned with extending revolutionary 
debates regarding sovereignty and the familiar struggle between power and liberty. As part of 
their strategy to win support, Wood argues that Federalists transformed the idea of “imperium ad 
imperio” by emphasizing that the Constitution placed sovereignty in the great body of the 
people.66 They also collapsed the opposition between power and liberty, arguing that in a 
government founded on the strength of the people, power in government protects liberty.67 Wood 
argues that these arguments appropriated the Revolution’s tradition of democratic radicalism to 
create a new strand of constitutional thought representing “the end of classical politics” and the 
rise of a new liberal political ethos in the American tradition.68 Furthermore, he aruges that the 
constitutional era as a whole should be considered as a fundamental struggle “between 
aristocracy and democracy.”69 
However, if one adopts the criterion of happiness, then conclusions can be drawn outside 
of Wood’s structured transition from classical republican to liberal. Wilson’s arguments can be 
                                                
64 Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 530-531.  
65 Wood’s account adds much to our understanding but is highly theoretical. For a more rounded approach 
to ratification, see: Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788. (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2010). 
66 Imperium ad imperio, meaning a “government within a government” was a popularly held political idea 
that there could only be one supreme sovereign in a polity. This logic was used to criticize the Constitution.  
67 Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic, Chapter XIII.  
68 Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 606-615. Wood argues that the “American Science of 
Politics” defeated an age-old problem in republican thought by minimizing individual virtue as an essential element 
of republican stability. Interestingly enough, he uses a quote from Wilson to make this claim which I argue is a 
misreading of Wilson’s emphasis, given his attention to the cultivation of the personal virtue of happiness.  
69 Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 485.  
 82 
read not as part of a protoliberal corpus of work designed to separate individual interest from the 
common good, but rather as the culmination of a new moral republicanism centered on the 
pursuit of individual advancement and fulfillment. His devotion to popular sovereignty, which he 
reinforced during ratification, as a core tenet of government also rebuts Wood’s claim regarding 
aristocracy. Although there were certainly Federalists who made aristocratic arguments, 
Wilson’s peculiar approach to constitutional thought illustrates how the institutions favored by 
Federalists could be utilized for individual empowerment as much as aristocratic restraint.70 
Wilson delivered the first major argument in favor of ratification in a speech outside of 
the Pennsylvania Statehouse on October 6, 1787. The “State House Yard Speech,” even more 
than the more famous and better studied Federalist papers, “captured most people’s 
imaginations” and generated sentiment in favor of ratification.71 Although the speech is not as 
helpful for understanding the origins and peculiarities of Wilson’s thought because he primarily 
responds to others’ criticisms of the document, it does help to set a foundational understanding of 
his justifications for various provisions of the document. In the speech, Wilson categorized the 
Constitution as a grant of specific powers by the people to a new federal government empowered 
to meet the general interest of the people. “Everything that is not given” Wilson explained, “is 
reserved” to the people.72 This critique was designed to answer calls for a bill of rights as well as 
to justify the specific powers given to the government. Because each power was designed to 
meet and ensure the general interest, an overreach of power would be impossible. Similarly, 
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although there was much concern that the Constitution’s institutional design (particularly the 
Senate) would lead to the establishment of an aristocracy, Wilson felt this to be an impossibility 
because under the Constitution, all power is derived from the people. As such, any person 
seeking distinction or office needed to gain their support first.73 Wilson’s speech ended with a 
partial reflection on the potential offered by the Constitution: “It is the nature of man to pursue 
his own interest in preference to the public good,” he opined, but through the Constitution, 
citizen’s energies would “turn the stream of influence and emolument into… new channel[s],” 
offering new hope for a republican future. The Constitution may not be perfect in an absolute 
form, he closed, but it was the “best form of government which has ever been offered.”74 
Although designed for a mass audience, Wilson’s justification for ratification contained several 
hallmarks of his constitutional vision, including popular sovereignty, empowered government, 
and the transformational potential of republican political culture.  
At the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Wilson had more space to fully expand on 
his views on government and the underlying logic behind them than he had in any previous 
forum. In this convention, Wilson was unparalleled in terms of education, reputation, and 
familiarity with the matters at hand. As one of the foremost architects of the system at the 
Federal Convention, it fell to him to do the heavy rhetorical lifting among the pro-ratification 
bloc of delegates. Although ratification was almost guaranteed by the convention’s robust 
Federalist majority, Wilson not only ably defended the document against strident criticism from 
vocal Anti-Federalists, but also successfully built a strong case for it on its own merits.  
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In his first speech to the Convention he approached constitutional thought broadly. He 
reminded the delegates that the Constitution provided both for current citizens and the “myriads 
of the human race” yet to be born who would eventually spread across the American continent.75 
The American people, he said, possess a “warm and keen sense of freedom and independence” 
coupled with a “sound sense” for what would “best promote their freedom and happiness.”76 It 
was the task of the delegates to the Federal Convention and also those in the hall listening to 
Wilson to ensure that government cultivated and improved that “sound sense” in order to best 
support their happiness. Wilson grounded discussion in his own dearly held principles which, to 
him, provided both justification and order to the new system. This is especially important 
because, as Wilson noted, this was the first historical moment where people were “assembling 
voluntarily, deliberating fully and deciding calmly concerning [their] system of government.”77 
Government was for the people and under the new system, power emanated like rays from the 
sun from the people to their government.78  
At the Federal Convention, the transactional nature of debates often limited both the 
scope and content of Wilson’s speeches and actions. At the Pennsylvania Convention, however, 
he had more latitude to connect constitutional provisions with fundamental principle, allowing 
for a better understanding of his motivations. Underlying all of it is a specific approach to human 
nature. “The nature of man is to live in a state of society” he noted, which in turn requires civil 
restraint to subsist. “Civil government is necessary to the perfection and happiness of man” and 
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so man needed to institute government to fulfill their potential and purpose.79 Of the options for 
government facing Americans, only one, the extended federal republic contained in the 
Constitution, could provide government with the power and flexibility needed to ensure citizens’ 
happiness and society’s tranquility while not sacrificing civil liberties.80 Under an extended 
federal republic like that devised by the Federal Convention, he assured delegates that “liberty 
will reign triumphant” and freedom will be secured for coming generations.81  
For this to succeed, however, sound general principles needed to guide government. For 
Wilson, of course, that meant first grounding the strength of government in popular sovereignty. 
He recognized it as inevitable that all governments must be ruled by a supreme and absolute 
power. The genius of the American republic, however, was that “the supreme absolute and 
uncontrollable power remains in the people.”82 Although distinct “streams [running] in different 
directions,” separated that power, the ultimate source remains the “one abundant fountain”: 
 the people.83  
This fact illustrates both the supreme advantage and the critical anxiety of Wilson’s 
approach to government. In a government of the people, “there is a remedy for every distemper 
in government,” so long as “the people are not wanting.”84 “For a people wanting to themselves,” 
however, “there is no remedy.”85 For Wilson, government remained a project of self-reclamation. 
Although the people had the power to change and shape their government and could always 
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ensure that government served the national interest and promoted happiness, the ultimate success 
of government depended on the people aspiring to higher levels of moral reasoning and conduct.   
Wilson extended this logic to cover pertinent issues raised by other delegates, including 
representation. He answered calls that representatives in Congress would not be tied closely 
enough to the needs of their constituents to ensure that corruption would not take hold. Wilson 
found this suggestion somewhat ludicrous. In the national government, he told delegates, the 
scope of representation was not critical as in state governments; national representatives would 
make decisions based on the general need to improve the happiness of all citizens.86 It was their 
attention to these needs and not their attachment to their locality that would prevent corruption. 
Such a contention reveals that Wilson had high hopes for the moral character of future citizens. 
He fervently believed that through participation in the newly designed republican system, moral 
feeling would be elevated along with the general wellbeing of the population.  
Throughout the ratification process, Wilson challenged others to see the Constitution as 
he did: as a complete system with a purpose larger than the sum of its individual statutes and 
collected language.87 Wilson’s continually expansive view of the task before him led him to see 
the Constitution as “a certain and solid foundation” for meeting the ends of society and ensuring 
prosperity.88 This could only be done by giving attention to the principles of happiness realized 
through good government. His “closing argument” for ratification emphasized that fact: the 
ultimate interest and happiness of citizens, states, and the nation as a whole depended on the plan 
for union. “By adopting this system,” the Constitution would insure America would shine as a 
                                                
86 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention,” in Collected Works, 200-201.  
87 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention,” in Collected Works, 208.  
88 James Wilson, “Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention,” in Collected Works, 215; 220.  
 87 
“temple of liberty.”89 The gift of good government would ensure the future of the American 
republic and guarantee for citizens “their improvement in knowledge and their advancement in 
happiness.”90 Arguing for ratification, Wilson joined together his previous work at the Federal 
Convention with a more thought-out attachment to his philosophical understandings of humanity 
and of government, demonstrating how government as a science was ultimately tied to the 
empowerment and improvement of individual citizens.  
Wilson’s constitutional vision developed first as he experienced new republican 
government as a citizen of Pennsylvania and then as he helped to craft a new national 
government. Too often, Wilson is assumed to be one of a faceless mass of federalists whose 
constitutional visions fell neatly in line with more famous figures like James Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton. As has been shown, however, Wilson developed his own theory of 
constitutional government derived from his experiences and philosophical viewpoints. That 
theory revolved around the idea of individual improvement so as to attain the realization of 
human happiness. Wilson’s belief that the end of society, government, and ultimately human life 
was the pursuit of lasting happiness shaped his view of government dramatically. His 
experiences in Pennsylvania, where decentralized and destabilized government illustrated the 
dangers weak government posed to the pursuit of happiness, convinced him of the merits of a 
more empowered, activist government.  
Many scholars argue Wilson’s opposition to the state constitution was anti-democratic. 
Understanding his thought using happiness as a framework, however, reveals a far more 
satisfying explanation for his dissent. In contrast to his anti-democratic reputation, there was no 
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delegate at the Federal Convention who argued more stridently for the empowerment of the 
people than Wilson. The consent and active participation of the people formed the base of 
Wilson’s “pyramid of government.” Where other delegates, including Madison, developed 
institutional mechanisms to limit the ability of the people to interfere in government, Wilson 
advocated that the people should be responsible for electing candidates at all levels of the 
government. Because Wilson gave the people such an active role in government, he saw little 
danger in empowering government and instead ensured that the national government would be 
empowered to meet the needs of citizens. The purpose of republican government, according to 
Wilson, was to refine individual’s moral and intellectual government to make them suited to 
pursue their own happiness. As a constitutional theorist, he worked from those principles to 
ensure that the United States’ Constitution, grounded in the ideas of happiness, would ultimately 

























The Republic of Happiness  
 
The Fourth of July, 1788 provided supporters of the Constitution in Philadelphia a grand 
stage upon which to celebrate their achievements. Ten states had ratified the document which 
meant that according to Article VII, the Constitution would take effect. New Hampshire, the all-
important ninth state, ratified on June 21. Virginia, critical because of its size and its projected 
importance in the new union, became the tenth state on June 25. On July 2, the Confederation 
Congress began plans to implement the new framework. For most federalists, James Wilson 
included, there was much to celebrate on that first Independence Day under the new 
Constitution. To do so, they planned a massive public spectacle emphasizing public support for 
the Constitution and the republican visions of its planners.1   
This was a critical project for the city’s federalists because they knew that although the 
Constitution provided a static framework of government, it was up to citizens to fill that 
framework with their own values. The parade contained everything from imagery memorializing 
the Revolution to showcases of the city’s artisan shops. One float heralded in gold letters the 
start of “A New Era” followed by lines of poetry: “Peace o’er our land her olive wand extends. / 
And white rob’d Innocence from Heaven descends. / The crimes and frauds of Anarchy shall fail/ 
Returning Justice again lifts her scale.”2 The poetry was crude, but it conveyed the essential 
expectations Federalists had for the new republic: peace, prosperity, security and stability, and 
equal justice for citizens. The parade ended outside the city at the Bush Hill estate where James 
Wilson gave a grand speech in favor of the federal union. This performance is highly revealing 
and came at a point of inflection for Wilson. For the past twenty years, he had been at the center 
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of weighty political debates over the true nature and ends of government, the nature of rights and 
liberties, and the meaning of happiness. Secure in the knowledge that the Constitution had been 
ratified, the speech was a time for Wilson to take stock of the past, and more importantly, to 
project forward a unique vision of the republican future.   
 Wilson’s analysis of the Constitution paralleled his conception of happiness. He began 
with the primary source of Constitutional power, the “whole people…performing an act of 
sovereignty original and unlimited.”3 Through that act, the people ensured that America would 
experience “just government … [and the] blessings that walk in its train.”4 First among these was 
peace, “the mild and modest harbinger of felicity.”5 Wilson’s equation of peace and felicity, 
(which was used synonymously with happiness), with the Constitution’s passage underscores his 
understanding of the intersection between happiness and government. In Wilson’s 
conceptualization, government supported society, allowing for the full expression of societal 
virtue and potential. “Disentangled from the intrigues and jealousies of European politicks,” the 
new American republic would allow for “the cultivation of all the arts of peace.”6 The republic 
would increase American’s material circumstance by providing for success and ingenuity in 
industry and prosperity in agriculture and commerce. It would provide benefits beyond the 
material by allowing for the cultivation of virtues, manners, and achievements at the individual 
level.7 Wilson believed strongly in the potential of republican government to reform societal 
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structures and individual habits. It was his belief that under the new constitution, American 
society would flourish in unseen ways and that individuals would achieve new levels of moral 
and material prosperity. In short, “where good government prevails” one can find “the county of 
science and virtue,” and “under a good government, therefore we must look for the accomplished 
man.”8  
 Wilson ended his speech with characteristic optimism for the future. “A progressive 
state,” he opined, “is necessary to the happiness and perfection of man.” and the Constitution 
provided the framework for that state. 9 From there, it was up to individuals to push themselves 
even further. Wilson’s mind was continually drawn to thoughts of the perpetual march of 
humanity –– “whatever attainments are already reached, attainments still higher should be 
pursued.”10 “Let us,” he urged, “with fervent zeal, press forward, and make unceasing advances 
in every thing that can support, improve, refine, or embellish society.” In doing so, the reformed 
American under the auspices of the new constitution would ensure “peace walks serene and 
unalarmed over all the unmolested regions…[while] thy happiness [would] be perpetual.”11 Such 
a closing conveys his profound belief in the frame of government that he had worked tirelessly to 
create.  
 Wilson continued to consider the nature and promise of the country he helped found 
throughout the 1790s. While by the end of the decade, the luster of the framers’ detached 
republican vision had faded, Wilson remained optimistic about the future and even laid out a 
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grand plan for the “Improvement and Settlement of Lands in the United States.”12 Wilson’s plan, 
predicated on the abundance of land in America and of labor in Europe, was designed to people 
the frontier with white settlers to increase the productivity and prosperity of America.13 His plan 
if adopted would have involved incredible government activity to carry it to fruition; Wilson 
called for new government departments to manage settlement, “capital inducements” either 
through land or other benefits to encourage investment, a new project of road building to connect 
western settlements to the coast, and even direct aid in the form of material and supplies to new 
settlers to help them establish farms.14 If adopted, it would have been an unprecedented example 
of government activity and management of economic expansion. What is most striking about it is 
how characteristically Wilsonian it was. He strongly believed in the possibility that human 
society could reach new heights and never doubted that the world around him could be improved 
through the application of sound reason and right principles. Through proper government action 
and form, Wilson believed that human happiness could be more perfectly achieved. The structure 
of his plan shows that he hoped to implement the principles of happiness at the heart of his 
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The process of surveying was essential for speculators to gain control of the land. See: James Wilson, “On the 
Improvement and Settlement of Lands,” in Collected Works, 384.  
It is also critical to note that, like many others in his generation, Wilson’s republican vision was built on a 
minimization of Native American agency and sovereignty. By crafting an image of vast unspoiled tracts of land for 
the American nation to expand to, Wilson denied the considerable presence of native tribes in the area. This attitude 
was pervasive among American republicans, evident in sources ranging from Jefferson’s Notes on the State of 
Virginia, to speeches from various delegates at the Constitutional Convention, to popular art and poetry at the time. 
For a particularly strong example which rhetorically linked Americans westward movement to the biblical conquest 
of Canaan see: Timothy Dwight, “The Conquest of Canäan: A Poem, In Eleven Books,” in Kornfeld, Eve, ed., 
Creating An American Culture: 1775 – 1800, (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), 88-93.  
14 James Wilson, “On the Improvement and Settlement of Lands,” in Collected Works, 383-384.  
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political thought as tangible actions in the New Republic and together, these two documents 
provide a final exemplification of how Wilson conceived of life in a republic founded on 
happiness.  
Wilson’s conception of the republic of happiness was grounded in the stimulating world 
of Enlightenment thought first exposed to him during his education in Scotland.  At St. Andrews 
and then at Glasgow, he learned from some of the most active scholarly minds in Europe and he 
developed a particular worldview predicated on common sense philosophy and the natural law 
theories of jurisprudence developed by Jean Jacques Burlamaqui. Like Burlamaqui, Wilson 
foregrounded human happiness when evaluating political action. This idea remained more 
influential than any other throughout Wilson’s career and his writings convey that he considered 
lasting happiness to be the highest virtue which humans should strive to achieve. Together, these 
two influences explain Wilson’s optimism, his belief in the power of human improvement, and 
his belief in the role government played to support human happiness.  
Wilson was not alone in seeking to perfect the society he lived in. One of the defining 
characteristics of Enlightenment thought, as has been illustrated vividly across Wilson’s 
intellectual career, was the belief that the application of reason and action could make tangible 
improvements in human society.15 As the eighteenth century progressed, thinkers  wondered 
about a new “utopia” –– not in the religious sense first proposed by Thomas More –– but rather a 
society guided by systematic knowledge of the mechanics by which societal problems could be 
minimized or eliminated.16 Especially prior to the French Revolution, there was hope for the 
                                                
15 Ritchie Robertson, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680 – 1790, (New York: Harper, 
2021). 
16 Gareth Stedman Jones, An End to Poverty?: A Historical Debate, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004), 1. Stedman Jones looks specifically at poverty but the pattern of thought can be universalized to 
encompass issues well beyond that.  
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transformative power of morally driven economic advancement.17 By the late eighteenth century, 
enlightenment thought combined with republican visions stimulated by the American Revolution 
occasioned a brief but critical turning point in the history of political thought.18 Wilson 
represents a version of that synthesis and it is as part of that synthesis that he is best understood. 
Although this synthesis was destroyed by reactions to the French Revolution, it is important to 
recapture its depth, both to better understand Wilson’s world, and to better understand the true 
meaning and influence of his thought.  
During the Revolution, Wilson utilized enlightenment ideals of happiness to structure his 
critique of the imperial relationship between Great Britain and the Colonies. Although often 
derided as an overly cautious thinker or even a closeted Tory, Wilson was a consistent advocate 
for the American cause and attention to his philosophical influences reveals a consistent theory 
of revolution grounded in the idea of happiness. Across a series of pamphlets and speeches 
written in the late 1760s and 1770s, Wilson critiqued British policy for not supporting colonist’s 
happiness in a way that a government ought to. As the British government continued to neglect 
American interests, Wilson’s critiques became more and more pointed until he finally 
determined separation was necessary as a delegate to the Second Continental Congress. Wilson 
was not a radical revolutionary by any definition of the word but he did believe that supporting 
individual happiness was the chief goal of any government. When governments failed to support 
that end and when citizens had exhausted any legal means of recourse, then Wilson believed they 
were fully justified in revolting.  
                                                
17 Gareth Stedman Jones, An End to Poverty, 3-4.  
18 Gareth Stedman Jones, An End to Poverty, 11-12.  
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Following Independence, Wilson worked tirelessly to translate his political thought into 
tangible systems of government at the state and federal level. In doing so, he became one of the 
foremost constitutional experts in the nascent republic and left an indelible mark on America’s 
governing systems. Wilson advocated for a consolidated national government imbued with 
enough power to act decisively on issues of national importance. The policies he advocated for, 
including the necessary and proper clause, were informed both by his critique of Britain prior to 
the Revolution and of Pennsylvania in the years after Independence. By empowering 
government, he sought to give it the tools to support citizens’ pursuits of happiness in a way 
prior governments never could. He also sought to involve people in government to the greatest 
degree possible and argued for the direct election of both senators and the chief executive. He 
did not fear government power because of the stock he placed in the consent of citizens –– if 
citizens were intimately involved in choosing the officers of government, then the government 
could not operate against the interest of its citizens for very long. Encouraging citizen 
participation also helped accomplish Wilson’s wider aim: that republican government would 
actively craft citizens’ personal and material development. Through this combination, Wilson 
believed that America’s constitution would be a positive force for realizing the greatest possible 
happiness for American citizens.  
Wilson’s thought also suggests ways to align revolutionary origins with revolutionary 
outcomes. Historians have long argued over whether there is a disconnect between revolutionary 
critiques in the 1760s and the passage of the Federal Constitution in 1787.19 When viewing the 
Imperial Crisis strictly through the lens of limited government, it is easy to draw a contrast with 
                                                
19 See for example: Michael J. Klarman, The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
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the powerful federal structure created at the Constitutional Convention. As has been shown, 
however, Wilson’s critiques of the colonial relationship were more far ranging and driven by his 
belief that the British government was not fulfilling its purpose in supporting its subjects’ 
happiness. He acted throughout the late 1770s and 1780s to craft a government that would be 
actively empowered to meet that purpose. Through the lens of the republic of happiness, 
historians can better connect colonial beliefs about the shortcomings of British government with 
revolutionaries’ own efforts to craft a government.  
The tragedy of James Wilson is that the intellectual dream he devoted his life to 
ultimately seeded his destruction. Throughout the period, Wilson heavily invested in western 
lands. Because of the complex process land speculation involved, there were often long delays 
between land purchase and the realization of profit. In between, speculators needed to continue 
making payments or their claims would be foreclosed. So long as a steady stream of capital 
could be maintained, the cycle of purchase, payment, and profit would continue seamlessly to the 
speculators’ benefit. In the late 1790s, however, a capital crisis rocked the American economy 
and Wilson struggled to cover his debts. He spent time in a debtor’s prison and then escaped 
south, nominally as part of his duties as a Supreme Court justice, to escape his creditors. He died 
in disgrace in North Carolina in August 1798. Had he lived, he likely would have been the first 
justice to face impeachment hearings due to the impossibility of his financial situation.20 In his 
downfall as in his rise, Wilson displayed the same basic traits: enormous energy, a fundamental 
optimism, and a tremendous thirst for improvement. Even his ignoble end betrays his belief that 
the American Republic, through dedication to expansion and improvement, would promote the 
                                                
20 For a complete history of Wilson’s final days, see: Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father, 
1742-1798, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1956), Chapter XXV.  
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material and personal growth of its citizens in order to support their pursuit of happiness. While 
the pursuit crushed Wilson, that does not detract from the force of his dedication or the vividness 
of his dream.  
 The intellectual legacy of the American Revolution has enormous implications for how 
we consider the American political community. For much of the nearly two hundred and fifty 
years since America asserted its independence, the Revolution has largely been presented in a 
singular fashion. As summarized by one historian, “Americanism,” as an ideal is synonymous 
“with the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.”21 By this he largely means 
freedom from tyranny and freedom to pursue one’s passions. Government, he writes, is 
necessary only to “protect individuals from force” and to “define a sphere of liberty” within 
which individuals can act according to their will.22 While this portrait of “ethical individualism,” 
as he terms it, is certainly represented in both the founding generation and in contemporary 
discourse, reducing the whole of American intellectual work to this idea does a disservice to the 
nuanced nature of revolutionary thought.  
Careful study of James Wilson and his vision of the republic of happiness suggests new 
facets for what constitutes “Americanism,” ones which were not necessarily foregrounded 
throughout the progressive course of American history but which nevertheless were central to 
intellectual understandings during the American Revolution. First, Wilson thought government 
should play an active role in supporting society. This is evident in his philosophic reflections on 
the nature of man, society, and government, in his critiques of British power during the Imperial 
Crisis, and in the framework of government he advocated for at the Constitutional Convention. 
                                                
21 C. Bradley Thompson, America's Revolutionary Mind: A Moral History of the American Revolution and 
the Declaration That Defined It, (New York: Encounter Books, 2019), 346.  
22 C. Bradley Thompson, America’s Revolutionary Mind, 346.   
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Wilson believed both that properly designing government and actively empowering it to 
accomplish certain ends would provide the best support for citizens’ pursuits of happiness. I do 
not mean to advocate that Wilson’s thought should be utilized to justify today’s progressive 
agenda, which seeks to use the power of government to accomplish a number of policy aims, or 
that Wilson would necessarily agree with these uses of government power. To do so would be 
equally inappropriate and ahistorical. However, Wilson’s thought does demonstrate that the 
lessons we pull from the Revolution should not be limited to the precepts of limited government 
and libertarian personal freedom.  
More importantly, Wilson cast politics in moral terms, a quality too often ignored in the 
American political lexicon. He repeatedly asserted that the purpose of political action was the 
support of individual happiness. This connection drove his development of a unique republican 
approach wherein government was structured to aid individual’s moral and material 
improvement. Living in a republic required a higher standard of moral conduct for citizens, but 
Wilson had high hopes for the republic he helped found, believing that a new republican culture 
would elevate citizen’s moral sensibilities, align them more closely with natural law, and 
ultimately help citizens realize a more perfect happiness. Wilson’s political language was that of 
virtue and the common good –– naturally calling to mind qualities of republican simplicity, 
selflessness, and service to the community. It is not difficult to see how recapturing that moral 
language could provide important benefits to political culture in our contemporary world.    
Centering James Wilson in the discussion of revolutionary thought challenges traditional 
interpretations of the Revolution and his republic of happiness points to a more optimistic 
outcome for the Revolution as a whole –– one where citizens would be elevated to new heights 
and prosperity through the enlightening influence of the republic of happiness. Although the final 
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outcome of the Revolution did not reach the lofty goals that men like Wilson envisioned and the 
benefits of the government Wilson helped craft were denied to too many for too long, the 
philosophical underpinnings of Wilson’s work remain an aspect of American heritage that can 
now be claimed by all. The pursuit of happiness provides the basis for the most aspirational of 
American ideals and through the work of James Wilson, happiness as an ideal was imbued in the 
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